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This dissertation considers the current position of the boni mores in the South African law of 
contract, and will examine the correctness and constitutionality of this position. Since the 
advent of the Constitution, there has been a constant movement towards a system of law 
which promotes the fundamental values upon which our Constitution is based, namely the 
values of freedom, equality and dignity. However the law of contract has remained somewhat 
resistant to this call for transformation, with the Supreme Court of Appeal clinging to legal 
certainty and the ideals of the classical liberal model to prevent the greater incorporation of 
certain normative values which would ensure the achievement of the transformation which 
the Constitution envisages.  
 
Although the principles of freedom and sanctity of contract, ensure legal certainty, 
predictability, and efficiency, these principles alone, fail to achieve the results which our 
Constitution calls for. One could even argue that these principles have the potential to 
achieve results which are potentially at odds with the demands of the Constitution. The boni 
mores, it is argued, is a value which can ensure the transformation of the law of contract in 
light of the Constitution, to a model of contract law which is focused on an objective standard 
that will achieve substantive fairness and contractual justice. This will ensure the focus will 
no longer be merely on the intention of the parties and the principles of freedom and sanctity 
of contract, and will enable a shift towards a model which will balance these principles with 
contractual justice and substantive fairness. This approach has been taken in the law of delict, 
which can be seen as fully embracing the transformative and developmental goals of the 
Constitution. 
 
This dissertation will consider the judgments of the Supreme Court of Appeal in which it was 
stated that normative values, such as the boni mores, cannot be used in the law of contract as 
an independent ground for interfering in contractual relationships. The main judgment being 
the case of Brisley v Drotsky;1 this case will be considered in detail, and a critical analysis of 
the judgment and the reasons put forward by the Supreme Court of Appeal will be 
undertaken. The constitutionality of the current position of the boni mores will then be 
examined. 
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‘"Illud constat", asserts Gaius, "si quis de ea re mandet quae contra bonos mores est, non 
contrahi obligationem, veluti si tibi mandem ut Titio furtum aut iniuriam facias": no 




This dissertation will focus on the current role of the boni mores in the South African law of 
contract. The boni mores has been a part of South Africa’s common law for many years 
playing its most prominent role in the wrongfulness enquiry in the law of delict. In recent 
years the courts have considered the possible role of the boni mores in the South African law 
of contract. The courts have had very different opinions regarding the role that the boni mores 
should play in this context.  
 
In the case of Mort v Henry Shields-Chiat2 Davis J suggested that the boni mores should play 
a more prominent role in our contract law. Davis J stated that although the constitutional 
value of freedom supports the contractual principles of freedom and sanctity of contract, 
other constitutional values, namely dignity and equality, calls for parties to observe a 
‘minimum threshold of mutual respect’3 in terms of which the ‘unreasonable and one-sided 
promotion of one's own interest at the expense of the other infringes the principle of good 
faith to such a degree as to outweigh the public interest in the sanctity of contracts’.4 Davis J 
stated that the court is given a constitutional mandate which gives the court the power to use 
the concept of boni mores to ensure that all contracts are in line with the Constitution5 
(hereafter referred to as the ‘Constitution’) and to incorporate other normative values to bring 
fairness and equity into the law of contract, such as good faith.6  
 
                                                            
1
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2
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However, in the case of Brisley v Drotsky7 (hereafter referred to as the ‘Brisley case’ ) the 
majority of the Supreme Court of Appeal (hereafter referred to as the ‘SCA’) held that it 
cannot permit the use of the principle of the boni mores in the South African law of contract 
for two reasons. The first reason is that the use of the boni mores in the South African law of 
contract would cause ‘unacceptable chaos and uncertainty.’8 The second reason given by the 
SCA is that the boni mores cannot be used in the law of contract the way in which it is used 
in the law of delict as there are ‘material policy differences’ between the two fields of law.9  
 
The view of the SCA that normative values, such as the boni mores, cannot play a role in the 
law of contract has been confirmed in subsequent cases such as Afrox Health Care Ltd v 
Strydom10 and SA Forestry Co Ltd v York Timber Ltd.11 However, more recently the 
conservative approach to limit the role of normative values, taken by the SCA in the Brisley 
case, has been questioned.12 The most recent example appears in the case of Siyepu and 
others v Premier, Eastern Cape13 where Alkema J stated that the law of delict and the law of 
contract are not as different as was stated in the Brisley case, and set out the many similarities 
between the law of delict and the law of contract. The judge stated further that there are 
circumstances where the use of the intention of the parties to determine the enforceability of 
the contract will fail and argues that the use of the wrongfulness enquiry, based on the legal 
convictions of the community, would be more suitable to determine enforceability of a 
contract.14  Another case which indicates a change in the thinking regarding normative values 
is the Constitutional Court judgment in the case of Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v 
Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd,15 where the Constitutional Court stated that it is necessary to 
‘infuse the law of contract with constitutional values, including values of Ubuntu.’16 This 
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8
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9
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statement, although made in respect of the value of good faith, shows that the courts are more 
willing to recognise that the Constitution demands that the law of contract be developed to 
ensure that it embraces the Constitution and the values which underlie it.    
 
1.2 Purpose of the study: 
The law of contract forms a fundamental part of our everyday lives; we enter into many 
contracts merely performing our usual daily activities. Often we enter into these contracts 
without realizing that we are doing so, for example entering private property on which a 
disclaimer is displayed exempting the liability of the owner and his or her employees for any 
loss or harm you might suffer on his or her property. Commerce would be unimaginable in 
the absence of the ability to enter into contracts.17 Almost every aspect of the law of contract 
is subjected to precise rules, leaving little place for open-ended principles that strive for 
substantive equity and fairness in the law of contract.18  
 
The South African law of contract is founded upon principles such as freedom of contract and 
pacta sunt servanda, concepts which emerged centuries ago.19 It is based on a model in terms 
of which a ‘free market where voluntary participation by individuals on an equal footing in a 
bargaining process without state intervention’ is deemed to result in the ‘greatest public 
good’.20 However this fails to consider the social and economic realities which South Africa 
faces, today contracting parties are almost always in different bargaining positions, while the 
‘ignorance and inexperience’ of some contracting parties and the emergence of standard form 
contracts adversely affects freedom.21 This is especially apparent today where many people 
are motivated by profit and self-interest and as a result the values of fairness, equity and 
justice can be compromised. This is evident in the South African law of contract where 
frequently parties take advantage of the weakness of the other contracting party and where 
parties enter into contracts which might be technically lawful but which society would not 
approve of. 
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 S Cornelius ‘Consensus and contracts’ (2011) The Daily Mail-Legally speaking 48. 
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 A Van Aswegen ‘The implications of a Bill of Rights for the law of contract and delict’ (1995) 11 S. Afr. J. on 
Hum. Rts. 65. 
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The potential for the abuse of the contractual principle of freedom of contract, present in the 
South African law of contract, was identified by the South African Law Commission in its 
discussion paper on unfair contract terms; in which it set out examples of the injustices in the 
law of contract in its current form.22 These examples were set out as follows: 
‘Common examples of such situations abound, but a few examples will suffice: the head of a 
homeless family urgently in need of a roof over their heads signs a lease which gives the 
lessor the right to raise the rent unilaterally and at will, and the lessor doubles the rent within 
five months; an uneducated man signs a contract of loan in which he agrees to the jurisdiction 
of a High Court, to find out only later, when he is sued that a lower court also had jurisdiction 
over the matter and that the case could have been disposed of at a much lower cost to himself; 
a man from a rural area purchases furniture from a city store on standard, pre-prepared hire-
purchase terms, later to find out that he has waived all his rights relating to latent defects in 
the goods sold; an illiterate and unemployed bricklayer agrees to act as subcontractor for a 
building contractor on the basis that he must at his own expense procure an assistant, and so 
on.’23 
 
Van Aswegen has acknowledged that the South African law of contract is not ‘flexible 
enough’ to bring about the change which is necessary to address these issues.24 Therefore one 
can argue that there is a need for a mechanism in the law of contract which could impose a 
form of ‘social control’ over the private law right to freedom of contract as was suggested by 
the South African Law Reform Commission in its report on the promulgation of general 
unfair contract terms legislation.25 The boni mores, which is informed by good morals, 
constitutional values and the legal convictions of the community, can be used as a mechanism 
to incorporate an ethical standard into the law of contract and can be used to address the 
abuse of freedom of contract by imposing a form of external and objective control over the 
contract. Therefore the rationale for this study is to argue in favour of the use of the boni 
mores in the South African law of contract as a way to incorporate an equity mechanism and 
to ensure that the law of contract meets the demands of the Constitution. 
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The purpose of this study is to critically analyse the current role of the boni mores in the 
South African law of contract; and to consider whether this role is in line with the demands of 
the Constitution. A further purpose of this study is to consider the correctness of certain 
views of the courts26 in respect of the role of the boni mores in contract law and to pose the 
question whether this role is constitutional and logical. The final purpose of this study is to 
examine whether the boni mores is an appropriate mechanism to incorporate an ethical 
standard into the law of contract. 
 
1.3 Outline of the proposed research: 
This study will be divided into six chapters. The second chapter will contain a discussion of 
various concepts which will be used throughout this study. These concepts will be discussed 
with reference to various academic writings and case law. The third chapter will contain a 
discussion of the development of the role of the boni mores in the South African law of 
contract and will set out the role currently played by the boni mores in this context. This 
discussion will include reference to the case law which is of direct relevance to this study.27 
Reference will also be made to various academic writings. This chapter will also consider the 
arguments regarding whether or not the boni mores and public policy are merely the same 
concept with the same meaning. Further this chapter will contain a discussion of how the boni 
mores is used in the delict and how the courts apply this principle in delictual cases. 
 
Chapter four will contain a critical analysis of the Brisley case which has set the precedent on 
this matter. The facts of this case and the conclusion of the SCA will briefly be set out. The 
focus of the analysis will be on the reasoning of SCA in respect of its refusal to allow the 
boni mores to play a greater role in the South African law of contract. The correctness of this 
reasoning will be evaluated, with reference to academic writings and case law which have 
discussed this case. Further this chapter will contain a discussion of the SCA’s predilection to 
the use of the intention of the parties to determine the enforceability of a contract over the use 
of normative values such as the boni mores. Lastly this chapter will contain a discussion of 
whether the parties should be allowed to independently determine which contracts should be 
enforceable without reference to some form of external standard to ensure equity and fairness 
when contracting.  
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Chapter five will contain an examination of whether this limited role which the boni mores 
plays in the law of contract meets the requirements of the Constitution; or whether the 
Constitution and the values which underlie it require some external standard to be imposed on 
the law of contract to ensure that it is in line with the demands of the Constitution. This 
chapter will contain a discussion of the various values which underlie the Constitution, which 
will be defined in chapter two, and what these values require (for example, the constitutional 
value of Ubuntu and the value system of communitarianism, both of which require there to be 
a level of mutual respect between individuals). This chapter will also contain a discussion of 
the Brisley case in the context of the Constitution. This will include a discussion of whether 
this judgment is in line with the Constitution. Reference will be made to academic writings 
which have discussed the finding of this SCA judgment, and those judgments which have 
followed its approach. Finally, chapter six will contain a summary of the key findings of the 










Chapter 2:  
Concepts and definitions: 
 
2.1. Introduction:  
In this chapter the concepts which are central to this dissertation will be set out, to create a 
general understanding of these terms and how they fit into the law of contract. Firstly the 
boni mores will be discussed, starting with the basic definition, moving on to the history and 
then a detailed definition of the boni mores will be set out. The concepts of freedom and 
sanctity of contract will be discussed; as these concepts form the foundational principles for 
the law of contract and have been invoked by the SCA as a ground to justify the limitation of 
the role of normative values in contract law. Thereafter, the notions of communitarianism and 
Ubuntu will be defined; these notions hold an important role in South African law since the 
advent of the Constitution and could provide an appropriate portal for the use of the boni 
mores in contract law.  The concept of public policy will be discussed; this term has been 
used in the law of contract as a form of control over the operation of the principles of 
freedom and sanctity of contract. This term is closely related to the boni mores, a relationship 
which will be discussed in chapter three. The final concept to be discussed is that of the 
classical liberal model of contract law. Our modern model of contract law has been heavily 
influenced by the classical liberal model, and emphasises many of the same characteristics, 
such as freedom and sanctity of contract.  
 
2.2. The boni mores:  
The boni mores in its most basic form can be defined as good morals,1 nd as good moral 
standards.2 As an introduction, a brief discussion of the history of the boni mores will be 
undertaken. In Rome, 150 AD, adult men enjoyed absolute freedom and power over their 
actions, but had to act within certain boundaries.3 One such boundary was the boni mores; 
they could not act in a manner that was contrary to the boni mores of their community.4 The 
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 Online Library of Liberty website- available at: http://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/a-legal-glossary-by-roscoe-
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boni mores was said to mean the local legal customs as well as the morals of the community.5 
At this time law, religion and morality were all intertwined.6 During this time any 
transactions which were deemed to be contrary to the boni mores were void; as such these 
transactions did not give rise to any contractual obligations and therefore could not be 
enforced by the courts.7  
 
The boni mores was said to refer to the well-being of the public which involved public 
morals, health and safety.8 The boni mores were determined by the written law as well as the 
unwritten laws of long standing customs reflecting a community’s morality, but were 
ultimately determined by the judges’ ‘sense of equity and logic’ (whose main concern is of 
the public interest as opposed to the interests of the individual).9 Mayer-Maly explains that in 
Rome the edicts which mentioned the boni mores, saw the boni mores as an ‘ought 
preposition’, which embodied ‘standards whose binding force was unquestioned and self-
evident’ even though they were not changed into law.10 The boni mores were not seen as 
being part of the law, but were ‘legally relevant’ in specific cases and in such cases the boni 
mores would be regarded as a legal source.11 
 
Aquilius stated that morals have always influenced the law and became crystallised into legal 
principles.12 As a result, contracts which were contrary to the morals of the community would 
not be enforced on the ground that the contract is immoral, even if such contract did not 
violate any known law.13 Aquilius stated further that ‘what is immoral is a question of fact 
not a legal problem’.14  
 
In most modern legal systems there is some sort of limitation on freedom of contract. 
Zimmerman stated that: 




 Ibid 276. 
7
 ibid 278. 
8
 Ibid 285. 
9
 Ibid 285. 
10
 T Mayer-Maly ‘The boni mores in historical perspective’ (1987) 50 THRHR 76. 
11
 Ibid 76 – 77. 
12
 Aquilius ‘Immorality and illegality in contract’ (1941) 58 SALJ 344 – 345. 
13
 Ibid 345. 
14
 Ibid 346. 
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‘If a contract is at variance with the sense of decency of all just and fair-thinking people, if it 
carries a visible stamp of eccentricity so as to scandalize the reasonable man, it cannot 
possibly be upheld.’15  
The courts would not have wanted to enforce such contracts, as this could have been seen as 
assisting the wrongful contract, thus adversely affecting the repute of the law.16 
 
European countries are examples of those which have incorporated the boni mores as a 
mechanism to prevent the enforcement of a contract which offends the legal convictions of 
the community.17 Many European countries have enacted legislation which states that 
contracts which are contrary to the boni mores are invalid and unenforceable.18 However, in 
South Africa the incorporation of the boni mores was less significant. In South Africa the 
boni mores plays its most significant role in the law of delict, but it can be argued that it has a 
virtually non-existent role in the law of contract. 
 
The definition of the boni mores will now be set out. In Germany the courts have defined the 
boni mores as ‘the sense of decency of all fair and just-thinking people’.19 Mayer-Maly has 
stated that one would prefer that the boni mores be an ‘expression of legal ethics, inherent in 
the ruling economic and social system’.20 Mayer-Maly states further that one cannot construe 
the boni mores from a specific moral code, but rather that the boni mores stem from the 
‘minimum of common evaluations which no legal community can dispense with’, in other 
words he proposes that the boni mores are based on ‘everyday ethics’.21 Mayer-Maly sets out 
the three main areas in which the boni mores has functioned, these being:22 
a. The law of delict, to define injuries; 
b. The law of contract, as a limitation to freedom of contract; and 
c. Family law. 
 
                                                            
15
 R Zimmerman The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1992) 706. 
16
 Ibid 706. 
17
 Trans-lex website ‘Invalidity of contract that violates good morals (boni mores)’ http://www.trans-
lex.org/937000 (accessed 25 July 2014). 
18
 Zimmerman (note 15 above) 706. 
19
 Mayer-Maly (note 10 above) 61. 
20
 Mayer-Maly (note 10 above) 62. 
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Roscoe Pound defined the boni mores as that which ‘accorded with the settled custom of 
men, resting in tradition and sanctioned by social pressure’.23 In the case of Ismail v Ismail24 
the South African Appellate Division (as it then was) stated that the boni mores, ‘morals’ or 
‘morality’ in English, can be defined as:25  
‘the accepted customs and usages of a particular social group that are usually morally binding 
upon all members of the group and are regarded as essential to its welfare and preservation’ 
In the case of Compass Motor Industries (Pty) Ltd v Callguard (Pty) Ltd26 Van Zyl J stated 
that the boni mores is closely related to the notion of good faith, and is associated with 
society’s ‘perception of justice, equity and reasonableness’.27 Wille has stated that a contract 
is said to be contrary to the boni mores where it offend our conscience or our sense of what is 
right.28  
 
One internet source describes the boni mores as relating to:29 
‘fundamental values of society and is not of a purely legal nature. It includes basic legal, as 
well as economic, ethical, moral, and social values that the individuals of the relevant 
community generally consider binding and crucial for their peaceful coexistence in that 
community. Such fundamental values of morality and justice arise from and are based on a 
broad social consensus and thus shape the morality of a community. Good morals, therefore, 
involve a broad and objective standard. They relate to the social morality of a community, not 
to the individual morality of the judge or arbitrator who decides a given case.’ 
 
From the above discussion one can broadly describe the boni mores as the ‘legal, economic, 
ethical, moral, and social values’ of society, which takes the society’s ideas of ‘justice, equity 
and reasonableness’ into consideration, which requires a minimum standard of conduct in 
line with such standards and which the people of that society consider to be binding. The boni 
mores is seen as standards that every society needs for its continued peaceful existence. 
                                                            
23
 R Pound ‘The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines’ (1914) 27 (3) Harvard Law Review 201. 
24
 Ismail v Ismail 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A). 
25
 Ibid 1025G-H. 
26
 Compass Motor Industries (Pty) Ltd v Callguard (Pty) Ltd 1990 (2) SA 520 (W). 
27
 Ibid 528-9. 
28
 G Bradfield … et al Wille’s Principles of South African law (2007) 768. 
29
Trans-lex website ‘Invalidity of contract that violates good morals (boni mores)’ http://www.trans-
lex.org/937000 (accessed 25 July 2014)- Trans-lex is an online database containing transnational law, in terms 
of such transnational law, contracts which are contrary to the boni mores are deemed to be invalid and the 
courts have no discretion in such matter, the contract must be declared invalid regardless of the intentions of 




2.3. Freedom and Sanctity of contract:  
‘Freedom of contract, for instance, means that an individual is free to decide whether, with 
whom, and on what terms to contract.’30 
 
Freedom of contract allows parties to agree to anything which is ‘possible and lawful’.31 
Freedom of contract forms a ‘central tenet’ of the law of contract.32 Freedom of contract is a 
very liberal and individualist concept emerging from the classical model of contract law, 
which states that every person is free to enter into a contract on any terms and with any 
person they deem fit.33 Freedom of contract is premised on the idea that the contracting 
parties have equal bargaining power and thus have equal power to impose and reject 
contractual terms.34 In terms of the principle of freedom of contract a contract is created as a 
result of ‘free choice, without external interference’ where the parties to the contract are 
sovereign.35 Freedom of contract is linked to the concept of pacta sunt servanda, i.e. sanctity 
of contract,36 which requires that all contracts, voluntarily entered into, be honoured.37 The 
concepts of freedom and sanctity of contract are the expressions of contractual autonomy.38 
 
The concepts of freedom and sanctity of contract form the cornerstones of the South African 
law of contract; these concepts inform the law of contract and set out its ‘ideological 
underpinnings’.39 These being such fundamental principles in the law of contract, judicial 
interference in contractual relationships is generally viewed with scepticism.40  
 
                                                            
30
 S W J Van Der Merwe … et al Contract: General principles (2012) 9. 
31
 Hutchison … et al (note 2 above) 7. 
32
 H De Villiers ‘Limitations on party autonomy in the context of cross-border consumer contracts: The South 
African position’ (2013) 3 TSAR 478. 
33
 D Bhana, M Pieterse ‘Towards a reconciliation of contract law and constitutional values: Brisley and Afrox 
revisited’ (2005) 122 4 SALJ 867; see also Hutchison … et al (note 2 above) 23. 
34
 K J Chrysostome ‘The future of standard form contracts in South Africa with particular reference to recent 
developments in the law’ (unpublished LLM thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2009) 5. 
35
 Hutchison … et al (note 2 above) 24. 
36
 To be discussed in greater detail in a further on in this chapter. 
37
 Hutchison … et al (note 2 above) 21. 
38
 D Bhana ‘Constitutionalising contract law: Ideology, judicial method and contractual autonomy’ 
(unpublished PhD thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 2013) 44. 
39
 Hutchison … et al (note 2 above) 21. 
40
 Bhana & Pieterse (note 33 above) 867. 
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In terms of our common law the principles of freedom and sanctity of contract will prevail, 
with the conclusion of the contract said to signify that all the parties have understood and 
agreed to all the terms of the contract.41 The hegemony of the freedom of contract principle is 
reinforced by the courts; an example of this is the case of Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes42 in which 
Smalberger JA stated that ‘public policy generally favours the utmost freedom of contract, 
and requires that commercial transactions should not be unduly trammelled by the restrictions 
on that freedom’.43 It also appears that freedom of contract has been elevated to the status of a 
constitutional value by the SCA,44 a value which requires contracts to be strictly enforced.45 
The Constitutional Court has stated that ‘the ability to regulate one’s own affairs, even to 
your own detriment’, is an essential part of freedom and dignity.46 Freedom of contract, 
however, despite being one of the dominating principles of our law of contract, has certain 
limitations. The main limitation to freedom of contract is public policy.47 
 
Sanctity of contract requires that all contracts ‘freely and seriously entered into must be 
honoured’ and enforced.48 Ngcobo J has stated that sanctity of contract is a ‘profoundly moral 
principle’.49 The reason for the principle of sanctity of contract is to facilitate agreements, as 
people would be less willing to enter into contracts if they knew contracts would not be 
honoured, so sanctity of contract serves as a guarantee that free and voluntary contracts are 
enforced.50 However this guarantee does not apply to contracts which violate public policy.51 
This principle is said to serve a ‘diverse policy of expediency’ called for by principles such as 
public policy and the boni mores:52 ‘it is a rule of ethics that one should keep one's promise; 
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it is a question of expediency whether the machinery of legal enforcement should be available 
to give it effect.’53 
 
2.4. Ubuntu:  
‘I am, because we are; and since we are therefore I am’54
 
Ubuntu is a notion which emerges from African jurisprudence. It is a difficult term to define 
and is constantly changing.55 Some have translated the word Ubuntu to mean ‘“humanity", 
"personhood" or "humaneness"’.56 However, Bennett has stated that these translations are not 
of any use as they fail to express all which the notion of Ubuntu encompasses.57 Mokgoro has 
stated that defining Ubuntu with precision is an unattainable goal.58 Mokgoro states that a 
literal translation of one of the fundamental beliefs under Ubuntu means that ‘a person can 
only be a person through others’.59 Despite the difficulty of defining the exact meaning of the 
notion of Ubuntu, it is still used in many fields of law and has formed one of the underlying 
values of our Constitution.  
 
The notion of Ubuntu was first referred to by the Constitutional Court in case of S v 
Makwanyane.60 Mokgoro J set out what the notion of Ubuntu encompasses, stating that it 
shows the importance of group solidarity, and includes values such as ‘compassion, respect, 
human dignity, conformity to basic norms and collective unity, in its fundamental sense it 
denotes humanity and morality. Its spirit emphasises respect for human dignity, marking a 
shift from confrontation to conciliation’61 
Mokgoro J also stated that the Bill of Rights was facilitated by Ubuntu, which underlies the 
Bill of Rights.62 Langa J, in the same case, declared that Ubuntu emphasises the idea of 
everyone being dependent on each other and recognises that everyone as human beings have 
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the right to ‘respect, dignity, value and acceptance’ from the community.63 Langa J states 
further that Ubuntu also regulates the exercise of these rights, requiring that everyone have 
‘mutual enjoyment’ of the rights.64 
 
The notion of Ubuntu has been said to be ‘based on the notion of interrelatedness of cultural 
affinity and kinship’ and is ‘used to describe the quality or essence of being a person’.65 It is a 
notion which means that a person’s humanity depends on the ‘appreciation, preservation and 
affirmation’ of the humanity of others.66 It is an essential ideology under the notion of 
Ubuntu that: 
‘I am a friend to myself because others in my community have already been friends to me, 
making me someone who could survive at all, and therefore be in the community. It is only 
because I have always been together with others and they with me that I am gathered together 
as a person and sustained in that self-gathering.’ 67  
Thus this means that the existence of humanity is dependent on your relation with those 
around you, as people cannot live in isolation as you owe your existence to those around you, 
and as such each person is part of a whole which is the community.68 Ubuntu requires all of 
us to recognise the humanness of others and to respect that humanness as an ‘object worthy 
of dignity and respect’.69 According to this notion, if you depreciate and disrespect others; 
you are depreciating and disrespecting yourself.70  
 
Mokgoro states that the African values which Ubuntu embodies are compatible with the 
Constitution.71 Ubuntu is communitarian by nature.72 In terms of the notion of Ubuntu people 
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are ‘intertwined in a world of ethical relations and obligations’.73 In the case of Port 
Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers74 Sachs J explains that the notion of Ubuntu is 
part of our Constitution and has influenced our new constitutional order, explaining further 
that it ‘combines individual rights with a communitarian philosophy’ and that Ubuntu 
performs a vital function ‘in our evolving new society’ which is in need of ideals calling for 
‘human interdependence, respect and concern.’75 
 
Even though Ubuntu is a constitutional value it has not been received well into some areas of 
private law.76 The law of contract is one such area which has proven impervious to the 
infusion of the notion of Ubuntu. Although the law of contract does have concepts in place 
that can achieve similar outcomes as Ubuntu would, such as public policy, the impact of 
these concepts are limited as they do not have an ‘unlimited scope of operation’.77 Be nett 
recognises that the courts have been conservative when using the notion of Ubuntu in areas of 
private law such as the law of contract and are hesitant to infuse new ideas into the law.78 
However the significance of the notion of Ubuntu, in relation to the law of contract, was 
bolstered by the Constitutional Court in the case of Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v 
Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd79 in which the Constitutional Court stated that it is necessary to 
infuse constitutional values, such as Ubuntu, into the law of contract. 80 The Constitutional 
Court declared further, per Yacoob J, that the notion of Ubuntu is relevant especially when 
developing the common law. 81    
 
2.5. Public Policy:  
‘A  contract against public policy is one stipulating a performance which is not per se illegal 
or immoral but which the courts, on the ground of expedience, will not enforce, because 
performance will detrimentally affect the interests of the community’82 
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Before looking at the definition and content of the concept of public policy, a brief discussion 
of the development of public policy in the law of contract will be undertaken. Public policy 
was seen as an alternative to the substantive defence of the exceptio doli generalis. In the 
case of Bank of Lisbon and South Africa ltd v De Ornelas and another,83 Jansen JA held that 
the exceptio doli generalis was closely related to defences which were founded on the 
concepts of public policy and the boni mores and in some instances they overlap.84 The use of 
public policy in cases relating to unreasonable contracts was a new approach.85 
 
The use of public policy in such a manner was adopted by the (then) Appellate Division in 
the case of Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes86 where Smalberger JA confirmed that public policy is a 
vague expression.87 Smalberger JA stated that a contract is contrary to public policy where it 
is contrary to the interests of the public.88 The judge advised that no court should be reluctant 
to perform its duty to declare certain contracts void for being contrary to public policy.89 
However, the judge warned that this power should be used cautiously, as the improper and 
arbitrary use of such power would potentially lead to uncertainty.90 He suggested further that 
a judge must not declare a contract void merely because it offends that individual judge’s 
sense of justice and fairness, but only where the harm that will be caused to the public if the 
contract were to be enforced is ‘substantially incontestable’.91  
 
The finding of Smalberger JA in respect of the role of public policy in the law of contract, 
has led to rather unpleasant results, with those without a defence or a proper case frequently 
attempting to use the defence of public policy to salvage their hopeless case. As a result, an 
enquiry was instituted by the South African Law Commission which investigated whether the 
courts should be allowed to interfere in contractual relationships where the contract, or a term 
thereof, is unjust or unconscionable.92 This commission came to the conclusion that reform 
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was needed, and recommended that legislation be enacted which would address ‘contractual 
unfairness, unreasonableness, unconscionableness or oppressiveness’.93  
 
The Commission put forward a preliminary Bill which purported to control unreasonable, 
unconscionable and oppressive contractual terms by setting out the powers the court would 
have in cases where it was of the opinion that a contractual term was unreasonable, 
unconscionable or oppressive.94 However this legislation was met with great opposition.95 
The main thrust of the opposition was that providing the courts with such power would lead 
to legal uncertainty, which would in turn cause an increase in litigation.96 Ultimately, this 
proposed bill has not been enacted to date.97  
 
As can be seen from the above discussion of the use of public policy in the South African law 
of contract, public policy has for a long time been recognised as a mechanism to avoid the 
enforcement of certain contracts which the courts deem to be inappropriate to enforce. This 
position was crystallised by the Constitutional Court in the case of Barkhuizen v Napier,98 in 
which the Constitutional Court set out the approach in cases in which a contractual term is 
subjected to a constitutional challenge.99 The Constitutional Court, per Ngcobo J, stated that a 
constitutional challenge will give rise to the question of whether the contract or a term thereof 
is contrary to public policy.100 Ngcobo J stated that public policy embodies the legal 
convictions of the community, the values which society holds dear and is ‘deeply rooted in 
our Constitution and the values that underlie it’.101  
 
Ngcobo J stated that when determining the content of public policy reference must be made 
to the Constitution, i.e. if the contract is in conflict with values enshrined in the Constitution 
it will be deemed contrary to public policy and as a result will be unenforceable.102 However 
when giving the judgment on the facts of the case; Ngcobo J stated that the mere fact that a 
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clause limits a constitutional right does not mean that it is automatically contrary to public 
policy, rather what is required is for a two part test to be undertaken.103 The first part requires 
a determination of whether the clause is unreasonable, and the second part, if the clause is 
reasonable, is to determine whether the clause should be enforced.104 The Constitutional 
Court stated that this position accommodates sanctity of contract while still giving the courts 
the power to invalidate contracts on the ground that they are contrary to constitutional 
values.105  
 
The definition and content of public policy will now be discussed. Southwood AJA in the 
case of Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc and Others v National Potato Co-operative Ltd106
acknowledged that public policy is a difficult concept to define stating that public policy is 
constantly evolving.107 Kruger has stated that public policy is a mechanism which gives 
society, through the courts, some control over the contractual relationships of individuals.108 
It is not a rigid concept; it evolves, changing with society.109 Ngcobo J views public policy as 
being inseparable from the values of ‘fairness, justice and equity, and reasonableness’; it is 
informed by the notion of Ubuntu, rooted in the Constitution and acknowledges the need for 
‘simple justice between individuals’.110  
 
Wille states that a contract is contrary to public policy where it is contrary to the interests of 
the state, justice or the public.111 He declares further that the public interest is the principal 
concern to public policy.112 Where the contract is contrary to public policy it will not be 
enforced.113 Thus public policy can be seen as a limitation on the contractual principle of 
freedom of contract.114 When determining whether a contract is contrary to public policy one 
needs to look at the tendency of the agreement rather than the proved result.115 In the case of 
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Juglal and Another v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd t/a OK Franchise Division116 Heher JA 
held that a contract will be declared void for being contrary to public policy where the effect 
of the enforcement of the contract will lead to a ‘probability that unconscionable, immoral or 
illegal conduct’ will occur.117 Southwood AJA in the case of Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc 
and Others v National Potato Co-operative Ltd118 stated that ‘an agreement will be regarded 
as contrary to public policy when it is clearly inimical to these constitutional values, or the 
interests of the community, whether it be contrary to law or morality or runs counter to social 
or economic expedience’119 
 
Public policy is dependent on the context in which it is applied and it is likely to change over 
time and in respect of its sphere of application. 120 This characteristic makes it difficult to 
apply the concept mechanically, meaning that there are no structures or processes set out to 
assist in the application of the principle.121 Also there is no list of considerations to be taken 
into account when applying the concept of public policy to a set of facts, judges are required 
to identify considerations which are relevant to the case when determining whether the 
contract should be enforced.122 Kruger, after surveying a number of cases, has identified a 
number of considerations which have been said to be relevant to the question of whether the 
contractual term is contrary to public policy.123 These include the following:124 
• morality; 
• the administration of justice; 
• the interests of the community and social or economic expedience; 
• the necessity for doing simple justice between contracting parties; 
• the interests of the state, or of justice, or of the public; 
• the free exercise by persons of their common law rights; and  
• the concept of Ubuntu. 
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Kruger states further that with each new case it would be necessary to identify new 
considerations that would be relevant to that particular case.125 He opines that there are no 
restrictions on what the court can consider when applying public policy.126 Public policy 
generally favours the freedom of contract, however it also takes into account the need for 
‘simple justice between man and man’.127  
 
This concept has also been subjected to a great deal of criticism. This is because the use of 
public policy requires a court to take into account broad concepts such as equity, fairness and 
justice, which, it is often believed, can lead to the consequence of legal uncertainty.128 Some 
have described public policy as an ‘unruly horse’ which is difficult to control and often you 
do not know where it is taking you to.129 This fear of uncertainty is not assisted by the fact 
that there is little guidance of how this concept is to be applied.130 This fear of uncertainty 
exists despite the fact that the Constitutional Court stated that since the introduction of the 
Constitution the content of public policy is clear.131 The test set out in Barkhuizen v Napier132 
does not provide much guidance, it sets out that reasonableness and fairness are relevant 
considerations, but the Constitutional Court fails to qualify what this entails.133 However, 
Kruger argues that the uncertainty caused by the use of public policy is not as fatal as some 
make it out to seem. Kruger explains that legal certainty is not the only consideration to be 
taken into account, as our Constitution has placed a greater emphasis on fairness, justice and 
equity. Arguing further he states that the adverse impact on legal certainty is outweighed by 
benefits gained through the use of public policy.134 This echoes the sentiments of Olivier J as 
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expressed in Eerste Nasionale Bank v Saayman,135 which case will be referred to 
elsewhere.136 
 
2.6. Communitarianism:  
Communitarianism gives priority to the community as a whole, rather than to the 
individual.137 Thus it is similar to the notion of Ubuntu, by focusing on the community. This 
ideal entails that ‘human identity is constituted through the social realm’.138 It holds that 
people cannot achieve fulfilment in isolation, but rather it must be done with the 
community.139 This idea is focused on the achievement of common good.140  
 
McCann defines communitarianism as a ‘social philosophy that identifies the individual as 
socially constituted’.141 Communitarians are opposed to the idea of humans as 
‘individualised, solitary and “atomistic” beings’ who are unrestricted by ‘social identity or 
communal ethics’, believing that people obtain their identity from their participation in the 
community.142 Communitarianism is opposed to individualism as it is believed that where 
individual rights are supreme, the common good can possibly be side-lined.143 
 
2.7. Classical liberal model: 
The South African law of contract is mainly founded upon the classical liberal model.144 The 
classical liberal model emerged during the industrial revolution, during which there was a 
shift in the structure of society, and the freedom of the individual became paramount.145 This 
required that all people be allowed to exercise free will and be able to govern their own lives, 
in respect of private matters.146 Under this model state intervention in the private affairs of 
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individuals is only allowed where such intervention is called for by the ‘superior moral 
authority’ and if the intervention is limited to a very ‘narrow ambit’.147 
 
Bhana has described the classical liberal model as being a model in which ‘a strongly 
individualist concept of autonomy thus prevailed, with the values of self-interest, self-
reliance and self-determination paramount, and collectivist concerns minimal’148 
 
The classical liberal model of contract law places emphasis on autonomy, requiring a ‘non-
interventionist and individualistic approach’ to contract law.149 Freedom of contract 
constitutes one of the foundational principles under the classical model of contract law.150 
Bhana states that the classical model ‘embraces a laissez faire approach that generally 
respects the contracting parties’ freedom to arrange their affairs as they see fit, by way of the 
terms of their contract.’151 Barnard-Naude also explains that under this model individualism 
is emphasised, stating as follows: 
‘Individualism accepts as given a world of independent individuals who are encouraged to 
prefer the pursuit of self-interest rigorously. A consideration or sensitivity for the interests of 
others falls outside of the aims of this way of life, although one should be prepared to obey 
the rules that make it possible to co-exist with other self-interested individuals.’152  
This means that this model has the potential to enable people to pursue their own self-interest, 
while giving little consideration to the other party.153 
 
Under the classical model of contract law the court will focus on the formal validity of the 
contract, i.e. where all the formal requirements for a valid contract are present the contract 
will be enforced, and the courts will resolve disputes through the application of archaic 
contractual rules.154 Bhana states that the role of the judiciary under the classical liberal 
model is limited to the function of a referee, which is a very procedural role.155 The courts 
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have very limited power to declare contracts invalid, only being able to do so in extreme 
cases.156 Also under the classical liberal model the circumstances of the parties are rarely a 
concern when considering the enforceability of the contract.157 This model ensures legal 
certainty, predictability and expediency, while placing little emphasis on contractual justice, 
as under this model it is presumed that all contracts are entered into in good faith, and thus it 
is assumed that all contracts are ‘inherently equitable’.158 
 
Bhana has identified how the modern model of contract law shows many of the 
characteristics of the classical liberal model, with a focus on contractual autonomy, with the 
principles of freedom and sanctity of contract remaining unaffected.159 However the modern 
conception of the proper nature and role of our law of contract pays more attention to 
contractual justice; this requires the use of normative values which can often lead to 




From the above discussion one can see that the concepts of public policy and the boni mores 
could be used to ensure contractual justice by enabling the courts to strike down contracts 
which are contrary to public policy and/or the boni mores, and that such concepts are 
informed and supported by the notion of Ubuntu and the values which underlie it. However, 
despite the communitarian nature of the Constitution one can see that the law of contract has 
maintained its classical liberal roots focusing on freedom and sanctity of contract, while 
normative values continue to have a very limited scope of operation. A discussion of the role 
of the boni mores in the law of contract as well as in the law of delict will be undertaken in 
the following chapter. Furthermore, the correctness and constitutionality of this current 
position in contract law will be discussed in the chapters to follow.  
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The role of the Boni mores in South Africa: 
 
3.1. The boni mores and the South African law of contract: 
The boni mores has formed part of South Africa’s common law for many years, but it has 
featured most prominently in the law of delict. It has however formed a part of the common 
law of contract under the legality doctrine. Under the legality doctrine a contract could be 
deemed illegal for being contrary to good morals.1 However, Van Der Merwe has stated that 
this does not mean that an extra criterion is introduced which takes the ‘notion of illegality 
outside the realms of the law’, stating further that the boni mores is only pertinent where it 
provides the ‘basis upon which a decision on the question of illegality is made in law’.2 
Therefore a contract will only be found to be contra boni mores where the contract is 
contrary to established rules, rather than wrongs which have not been established as such for 
the purposes of the law of contract. Thus the boni mores has a limited role under the legality 
doctrine. 
 
The courts have also considered the potential of providing the boni mores with a greater role 
in the law of contract when determining the enforceability of a contract. A discussion of the 
cases which deal with the use of the boni mores and other normative values in the South 
African law of contract will follow. In the case of Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De 
Ornelas and another3 Jansen JA held that contracts which offend the boni mores must be 
subjected to judicial control.4 Jansen JA held further that because there is no closed list of 
wrongs, reference must be made to the ‘prevailing mores’ and the community’s sense of 
justice as a norm.5 
 
Later, in the case of Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman6 (hereafter 
referred to as ‘Saayman’) Olivier J, in his minority judgment, concluded that a contract of 
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surety should not be enforced as in the circumstances the normative values of good faith, 
equity and fairness were against the strict application of the established rules of contract law.7 
The judgment of Olivier J, albeit as the minority, shows the movement towards a more just 
and equitable system of contract law through the use of normative values. This inspiration 
was drawn on in the case of Janse Van Rensburg v Grieve Trust CC8 where Van Zyl J, 
relying on the reasoning of Olivier J in the Saayman case,9 stated that the common law must 
be developed because the normative values inherent in our law of contract require such 
development, and that public policy, or the boni mores, demands that the common law ‘be 
extended and adapted to meet the needs of modern commercial practice’.10  
 
This notion was followed by Davis J in the case of M rt v Henry Shields-Chiat,11 in which it 
was confirmed that the boni mores is shaped by the legal convictions of the community.12 
Davis J held that the content of the law depends on the legal convictions of the community, 
which requires a consideration of our constitutional community which is based on the values 
of freedom, dignity and equity.13 Davis J stated further that, although the value of freedom 
supports freedom and sanctity of contract, one must take cognisance of the other 
constitutional values of dignity and equality which requires the parties to a contract to 
observe,14 ‘a minimum threshold of mutual respect in which 'the unreasonable and one-sided  
promotion of one's own interest at the expense of the other infringes the principle of good 
faith to such a degree as to outweigh the public interest in the sanctity of contracts’15 Davis J 
states that the courts are given a constitutional mandate to ensure that the law of contract is in 
line with the Constitution and the values which underlie it.16  
 
From these judgments one can see that there has been a gradual movement towards the 
promotion of greater contractual justice, but this movement was short lived in light of a host 
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of SCA judgments in which the use of normative values as independent principles in the 
South African law of contract was unequivocally rejected.  
 
In the case of Brisley v Drotsky17 the SCA stated that the enforceability of a contract cannot 
be made dependent on the boni mores as this would cause ‘unacceptable chaos and 
uncertainty’;18 and stated further that even though the boni mores are used in the law of delict 
without this concern of uncertainty, it cannot be used in the law of contract as there are 
significant differences between the two areas of law.19 The SCA stated further that normative 
values play a very limited role in the law of contract, stating that normative values are not 
independent rules which can be used to interfere in contractual relationships, as allowing 
courts to make decisions based on their own ‘sense of fairness and equity’ would cause 
‘intolerable legal and commercial uncertainty’.20 The finding of the SCA in the Brisley case 
has resulted in a long line of cases which confirm the views of the SCA regarding the limited 
role of normative values in the law of contract. 
 
The next case to consider such role was Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom,21 in which the SCA 
supported the conclusion arrived at in the Brisley case. The SCA stated that where a pre-
constitutional judgment was contrary to the Constitution and the boni mores the courts were 
allowed to depart from that decision,22 however it was held that normative values do not 
constitute an ‘independent or free-floating basis for interfering with contractual 
relationships’.23 The SCA stated that the courts have no discretion when it comes to the 
enforcement of a contract, and the courts must not rely on abstract values but rather 
established legal rules.24 Another SCA judgment following the same path is the case of South 
African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd.25 In this case Brand JA acknowledged the fact 
that normative values are fundamental to the law of contract, however stated further that 
these values are not independent rules which a court can use to interfere in contractual 
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relationships.26 Brand JA held further that these values merely ‘perform creative, informative 
and controlling functions through established rules of the law of contract’ and that a court 
cannot refuse to enforce a contract based on its own notion of fairness and equity.27 
 
Another case dealing with this question is Maphango and Others v Aengus Lifestyle 
Properties (Pty) Ltd28 in which the SCA again confirmed that the values of fairness and 
reasonableness do not constitute independent rules allowing the court to interfere in 
contractual relationships.29 Relying on the findings of the above mentioned cases, the SCA in 
the case of Potgieter v Potgieter30 again reiterated the point that normative values do not 
form independent rules allowing the courts to interfere in contractual relationships.31 Brand 
JA held further that, until the Constitutional Court finds to the contrary, this position will be 
maintained.32 
 
From the above discussion; one can see that most normative values have been afforded an 
extremely limited role in the law of contract. Some of the normative values have been 
completely rejected, such as the boni mores, while others have been reduced to merely 
constituting an underlying factor to be considered by the courts. From the above mentioned 
cases one can deduce that the boni mores no longer have an active role in the law of contract, 
with the SCA stating that it has no place in the determination of the enforceability of a 
contract.33 The SCA has made this position abundantly clear, even in the midst of vociferous 
academic criticism (which will be examined later). As a result there are few mechanisms 
present in the law of contract which can be employed to achieve substantive fairness and 
equity. As Bhana and Pieterse have identified, the courts have mainly concerned themselves 
with the formal validity of contracts, while ignoring substantive equity and fairness, in the 
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stated belief that this achieves consistency, predictability and expediency; this, however, has 
been at the expense of equity and fairness.34  
 
3.2. The boni mores and public policy: 
Constantly the terms boni mores and public policy are used; they are sometimes said to be 
different concepts- some declare that the boni mores have been replaced by public policy, 
while others use the two terms interchangeably with no cognisance of the possible difference 
between the two concepts. In order to attempt elucidation in this regard, this part of the study 
will consider the different views on the relationship between the boni mores and public 
policy. 
 
The distinction between contracts which are contrary to public policy and contracts which are 
contrary to the boni mores is not clear, and in some cases the contract can be defined as being 
both contrary to public policy as well as the boni mores.35 Plescia has stated that the boni 
mores and public policy are one and the same, stating that both refer to public well-being, in 
particular the standard of conduct required of the reasonable man.36 Wille states that the 
distinction is not definite, stating further that there is no real value in the distinction.37 This 
sentiment is shared by Hutchison who stated that there is no inherent value in the distinction 
as they often overlap, stating further that both ‘relate to society’s view of morality’.38 Joubert 
has stated that distinguishing between public policy and the boni mores is a difficult task as 
both are concerned with the public interest.39 
 
Aquilius declared that public policy, the boni mores and illegality are all related as, 
illegalities are immoral and all immoralities are considered to be contrary to public policy.40 
Some courts have referred to the boni mores as being part of public policy. The 
Constitutional Court has stated that the boni mores is part of public policy, i.e. public policy 
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is given meaning by, among other things, the boni mores.41 Therefore these courts have 
merged the two concepts. 
 
In the case of Africa v Standard Bank of South Africa Limited42 Van Rooyen AJ, following 
the decision of the SCA in the Brisley case, stated that the validity of a contract must not be 
determined in terms of the boni mores, stating that the boni mores has now been replaced by 
public policy which is informed by the Constitution.43 In the case of Janse Van Rensburg v 
Grieve Trust CC44  the court makes reference to public policy, stating that it is the modern 
version of the ancient concept of good morals or the boni mores.45  
 
The court in the landmark case of Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes46(per Smalberger JA) stated that 
illegality can arise through the contravention of public policy or the boni mores. Johnson 
believes that this can be read as meaning that the terms can be used interchangeably.47 
Christie has also stated that there is no purpose in distinguishing between the different types 
of illegality as they can all be used interchangeably.48 
 
Hawthorne refers to the fact that Wessels had undertaken an analysis of public policy and 
divided illegal contracts into different categories, i.e. contracts prohibited by legislation; 
contracts contrary to common law; contracts which have an objective that is contrary to 
public policy; contracts contra bonos mores; and miscellaneous illegal contracts.49 Wessels 
states that there are some contracts that would not be considered contrary to legislation, the 
common law or the boni mores, stating that this is where public policy comes in by covering 
contracts not covered by the other categories.50 Wessels stated further that public policy is 
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reflected in, among other things, good morals. Therefore, from Wessel’s division of illegal 
contracts, one can see that public policy and the boni mores are to be regarded as being 
separate concepts but which could be used interchangeably as there was little value in the 
distinction.51 
 
Van der Merwe states that the distinction between public policy and the boni mores is not 
clear. However, the author sets out the differences, stating that the boni mores will generally 
be invoked where the illegality relates to ‘everyday morals or standards of conduct set by a 
society’, for example norms which govern ‘honest and proper conduct’.52 Whereas public 
policy will be invoked where the contract is to the ‘detriment of the state, which obstruct or 
defeat the administration of justice, or which restrict someone’s freedom to act or to be 
economically active’.53   
 
Hawthorne states that the interchangeable use of the boni mores and public policy is 
‘historically as well as dogmatically incorrect’, stating further that ‘[it] either stretches sound 
morals beyond recognition or risks turning public policy into moralising paternalism’.54 
Hawthorne stated that public policy is rooted in the boni mores, although declaring that these 
are two very different concepts which should not be used as if they are one and the same.55 
 
Kroeze holds the same view as Hawthorne. Kroeze explains that in the Brisl y case the 
minority judgment of Olivier J merely equates the concepts of public policy and the boni 
mores.56 However, she believes, that there should be more than simple equating of the two 
concepts.57 She explains that to her understanding public policy refers to policy 
considerations set by ‘democratic institutions’; while the boni mores refers to a shared value 
system or ‘notions of justness and reasonableness’.58  
 
From the above one can see that there are many varied views as to the relationship between 
the boni mores and public policy. It is submitted that the two concepts are in fact different 
                                                            
51
 Hawthorne (note 39 above) 307. 
52
 Van Der Merwe … et al (note 1 above) 167. 
53
 Van Der Merwe … et al (note 1 above) 167. 
54
 Hawthorne (note 39 above) 318. 
55
 Hawthorne (note 39 above) 319. 
56
 I Kroeze ‘Contract, constitution and confusion: the case of Brisley v Drotsky’ (2006) 47 1 Codicillus 20 
57
 Ibid 20. 
58
 Ibid 20. 
31 
 
and as such should not be merely equated or used interchangeably. Both concepts are 
concerned with public interest and the morals of society, however public policy appears to be 
a broader concept which encompasses many normative values, (the boni mores included), and 
which applies to a more vast variety of cases. Whereas the boni mores appears to be a more 
limited concept, which would apply to less cases than public policy would. Public policy is 
concerned with the interests of the state, simple justice between individuals, the 
administration of justice, and the ability of the parties to exercise their legal rights.59 
Therefore if a contract is contrary to the interests of the state, undermines justice or the 
administration thereof or interferes with the exercise of a person’s legal rights, it will be 
deemed to be contrary to public policy. A contract need not be immoral for it to be deemed 
contrary to public policy.60 
 
If one were to consider the definition of the boni mores set out in chapter two as well as the 
above discussion of the boni mores, one can come to the following conclusion. The boni 
mores, it would appear, can more aptly be described as encompassing the fundamental values 
held by a society setting out a minimum standard of conduct which must be in line with the 
community’s sense of justice, reasonableness and equity. The boni mores are required for the 
continued welfare and preservation of the society.61 Therefore, the boni mores have a limited 
scope of application to specific cases, which infringe upon the fundamental morals of a 
society and its sense of reasonableness, justice and equity.62  
 
3.3. The boni mores and the South African law of delict: 
In the South African law of delict the wrongfulness of a person’s conduct is determined in 
terms of the boni mores, i.e. whether such conduct is in line with the legal convictions of the 
community.63 The boni mores can be described as an objective test which uses the criterion of 
reasonableness as a foundation.64 The test is whether the conduct was reasonable, taking into 
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account all the circumstances of the case and the legal convictions of the community.65 In 
doing so the court is required to balance the interests of the parties to the case.66 In th  case of 
Atlas Organic Fertilizer (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd67 Van Dijkhorst J stated that 
the court must also take into account ‘the morals of the market place, the business ethics of 
that section of the community where the norm is to be applied’.68 
 
Neethling describes the boni mores as a standard which allows the courts to adapt the law to 
ensure it is in line with the values of society which are constantly evolving.69 It was stated in 
the case of Van Eeden v Minister of Safety and Security (Women's Legal Centre Trust, as 
amicus curiae),70 that the court must make a value judgment when determining the 
reasonableness of conduct.71 The SCA in this matter stated further that this value-judgment 
must be based on ‘its perception of the legal convictions of the community and on 
considerations of policy’.72 The SCA stated that this test is very open-ended and flexible.73 
 
When making such determination the court does not test the legal convictions of the 
community, as there is no appropriate method of doing so in a reliable manner and the 
community would not have convictions on all matters to be decided by the courts.74 The 
courts do not look at evidence of what the boni mores consist of in each particular case; this 
is because the boni mores acts as a guide when the court must make the value judgment. It 
was stated in the case of Atlas Organic Fertilizer (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd75 
that the standard for determining wrongfulness provides a ‘legal standard firm enough to 
afford guidance to the court, yet flexible enough to permit the influence of an inherent sense 
of fair play.’76  
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In Van Eeden, the SCA stated that ‘in applying the concept of the legal convictions of the 
community the Court is not concerned with what the community regards as socially, morally, 
ethically or religiously right or wrong, but whether or not the community regards a particular 
act or form of conduct as delictually wrongful.’77 However the legal convictions of the 
community do reflect the values of society,78 as the community’s legal convictions are shaped 
by the morals of society.79 As a result, when determining wrongfulness, the court must take 
into account the ‘prevailing values of society’.80 In the case of Schultz v Butt81 Nicholas AJA 
stated that the legal convictions of the community are the convictions of those of the 
legislature and of judges. However this must not be understood to mean that the personal 
opinion of the judge must be imposed to determine what conduct is wrongful.82 The personal 
opinions of the judge; the parties or part of the community is not the measure of what is 
wrongful.83  
  
The constitutional values are now playing a greater role in the determination of wrongfulness 
in the law of delict.84 In the case of Carmichele v The Minister of Safety and Security85 the 
Constitutional Court stated that the courts have a constitutional duty in terms of section 39 (2) 
to develop the common law.86 This means that wrongfulness must be interpreted in such a 
way so as to provide greater protection to the values underpinning the Constitution.87 
 
In the case of AB Ventures Ltd v Siemens Ltd,88 Nugent JA explained that there are various 
ways of expressing the enquiry- for example the boni mores, the legal convictions of the 
community, or the reasonableness criterion. The judge explained further that although these 
expressions are very wide; they are still helpful as they provide guidance as to the nature of 
the enquiry.89 Nugent JA stated further that the cases over the past 30 years indicate that the 
enquiry is ‘whether contemporary social and legal policy calls for the law to be extended to 
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the exigencies of the particular case.’90 Therefore one can see that the use of the boni mores 
in the law of delict is not absolutely certain, but relies on precedent set out in previous cases 
to provide some guidance as to how this principle is to be applied. Loubser believes that the 
use of the boni mores can lead to vague results and can be ‘difficult to analyse’, therefore 
states that what is required is ‘an open and structured process of reasoning with reference, 
inter alia, to: 
• The specific rights and interests involved; 
• The relationship between the parties; 
• Relevant provisions of the Constitution and of other legislation; and 
• Relevant policy considerations.’91 
 
To sum up, the boni mores is a standard employed in the law of delict in terms of which the 
courts determine whether certain conduct is wrongful, and it consists of the prevailing legal 
morality of the community. It can be seen as a mechanism which enables courts in delictual 
cases to develop the common law in line with the prevailing morals of the community to 
ensure that the court is applying principles which are in line with the morals of the 
community at the time of the case (instead of rigid and outdated principles which will lead to 
unfair results in current times, because the boni mores changes and evolves with society). It 




Bhana observes how the law of delict bases liability on a ‘collectivist policy-oriented concept 
of wrongfulness’, explaining that this approach makes ‘substantive fairness and justice’ of the 
utmost importance.92 She explains further that the law of delict ‘favours a balancing’ of the 
applicable constitutional values, in a manner which has been envisioned by the Bill of 
Rights.93 Bhana argues that as a result of this fact, the law of delict has been positioned to be 
in line with the ‘substantively progressive and transformative rights, values and goals of the 
Constitution’, and that the further re-alignment of the law of delict with the Constitution 
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should not be a difficult task.94 Bhana and Pieterse have also identified that in the law of 
delict, liability is determined through the use of the legal convictions of the community, a 
concept which fully embraces considerations which are reflected in the Constitution.95 They 
argue that the law of contract is meant to follow the same path, and are puzzled by the fact 
that the SCA has placed legal certainty above this constitutional goal.96 
 
From this one can see that the law of delict has fully embraced the demands of our new 
constitutional dispensation, as was evidenced by the case of Carmichele v Minister of Safety 
and Security97 where the Constitutional Court stated that all courts have a general obligation 
to develop the common law to ensure it is in line with the Constitution.98 However, Bhana 
identifies how the law of contract has failed to do so, as it merely continues to be ruled by the 
single principle of contractual autonomy, which seems to trump all other values.99 The failure 
to bring about constitutional infusion in the law of contract will be discussed in greater detail 
in chapter five of this study. 
 
Barnard opines that the appropriate portal for the transformation of the common law of 
contract, lies within the legality doctrine, where the boni mores can ‘operate as a tool’ 
enabling the infusion of constitutional values into the law of contract.100 However, he 
expresses doubt whether the courts will use this tool, observing that it is unlikely that the boni 
mores will be developed (citing the line of SCA judgments which are against the use of 
normative values).101 Another issue to be considered has been highlighted by Barnard, who 
has raised the very important question of why the legal convictions of the community can be 
used in the law of delict to determine liability, but cannot be used in a similar manner within 
the law of contract.102 This is a question which has been inadequately answered by the SCA. 
The SCA has set out reasons for this view, however, but these have been refuted by many, as 
will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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Brisley v Drotsky:1 
 
4.1. Introduction: 
The Brisley case is one of the most important cases for the purposes of this dissertation. It is 
one of the few cases which deal directly with the role of the boni mores in determining the 
enforceability of a contract. The Brisley case can be seen as the genesis of the SCA’s 
conservative approach in respect of the application of normative values, such as the boni 
mores.2 It has been the authority upon which SCA judges have relied in subsequent cases, 
which have been discussed in chapter three of this dissertation. 
 
Bhana and Pieterse have observed how this case has caused the law of contract to revert back 
to its classical liberal roots and how it shows the SCA’s apparent hostility towards concerns 
for equity and fairness.3 They observe how this case, as well as the Afrox4 judgment, has been 
received with a less than warm welcome.5 Many are unsure of the SCA’s approach, namely 
to categorically exclude mechanisms which could possibly be used to control the effects of 
the operation of the classical liberal model.6 The authors further express concerns in respect 
of the SCA’s reluctance to acknowledge the need for the law of contract to be developed 
under the new constitutional dispensation.7 
 
Being such an important case, this chapter will set out the facts of this case, and will discuss 
the three separate judgments which originated from the SCA in respect of this case. A critical 
analysis of the judgment and the reasoning of the majority judgment will be undertaken. 
Finally, the SCA’s preference for the use of the intention of the parties, as a determinant of 
the enforceability of a contract, will be discussed. 
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The appellant in this case entered into a contract of lease with the respondent for the amount 
of R3500 per month, by means of a contract document which was purchased from a CNA 
store.8 This contract contained the standard ‘Shifren clause’, which required that any changes 
to the contract be recorded in writing and be signed by both parties in order to be valid.9 The 
contract also contained a cancellation clause which allowed for the cancellation of the 
contract for breach of a party’s duty.10 The appellant failed to pay the rental timeously and 
had failed to pay the full amount on one occasion.11 As a result the lessor attempted to cancel 
the contract in terms of the cancellation clause.12 However the lessee relied on an alleged oral 
variation of the lease agreement, in terms of which the lessor had allegedly agreed to accept 
the rental payment late.13 The lessor countered this argument by relying on the S ifren 
principle, i.e. that the oral variation was not valid as it was not reduced to writing and signed 
by both the parties.14 The lessee attempted to argue that the application of the Shifren 
principle would lead to unreasonable and unfair results and was and contrary to the principles 
of good faith and as a result should not be applied.15 
 
4.3. Finding of the Supreme Court of Appeal: 
The majority of the SCA found for the lessor, stating that if the SCA were to overturn the 
Shifren principle it would cause uncertainty.16 It was held that the non-variation clause was 
freely entered into and that it protects both the weak and the strong parties to the contract.17 
The majority acknowledged that courts are obliged to develop the common law in light of the 
spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights, however, opposed the idea of attacking the 
common law principles from ‘within the shadows of the Constitution’ and of departing from 
established principles in favour of normative values.18 The majority stated that such 
normative values do not constitute independent grounds for interfering in contractual 
relationships. More importantly, the SCA set out two main reasons why the boni mores 
                                                            
8
 Brisley (note 1 above) 2 & 4. 
9
 Brisley (note 1 above) 4. 
10
Bhana & Pieterse (note 2 above) 872. 
11
 Brisley (note 1 above) 2. 
12
 Bhana & Pieterse (note 2 above) 872. 
13
 Bhana & Pieterse (note 2 above) 872. 
14
 Bhana & Pieterse (note 2 above) 872. 
15
 Brisley (note 1 above) 11; see also Bhana & Pieterse (note 2 above) 872. 
16
 Bhana & Pieterse (note 2 above) 872. 
17
 Bhana & Pieterse (note 2 above) 872. 
18
 Bhana & Pieterse (note 2 above) 873. 
38 
 
cannot play a greater role in the law of contract to assist in determining the enforceability of a 
contract. When discussing the appellants arguments in respect of good faith, the SCA referred 
to the statement made by Davis J in the case of Mort NO v Henry Shields-Chiat19 in which he 
called for the greater incorporation of the boni mores. The SCA rejected the idea put forward 
by Davis J in respect of the boni mores, for two reasons. The first reason is that the use of the 
boni mores in the law of contract will cause ‘unacceptable chaos and uncertainty’.20 The 
majority stated that allowing judges to reject contracts based on normative values would 
cause a disregard for the contractual principle of sanctity of contract and would make judicial 
decision-making too subjective.21 The second reason put forward is that the boni mores 
cannot be used in the law of contract the way in which it is used in the law of delict as these 
two areas of law have ‘material policy differences’.22 The SCA stated that the differences 
between the law of contract and the law of delict are that in the law of contract the parties to 
the contract voluntarily determine their own rights and responsibilities in terms of the 
contract, however in the law of delict the rights and responsibilities of the parties in the 
matter will be determined by the legal convictions of the community.23 Thus, the boni mores 
was said to have no place in the law of contract. 
 
Olivier J, in a concurring judgment, although agreeing that overturning the Shifren principle 
would lead to uncertainty, stated that normative values require greater recognition in terms of 
the Constitution, arguing that the question whether the S ifren principle should be upheld 
should depend on the boni mores.24 Recognising the uncertainty that could result, Olivier J 
stated that such uncertainty is a ‘necessary price to pay’ to ensure fairness, emphasising the 
need to balance ‘legal continuity with social realities’.25   
 
Cameron JA, agreeing with the finding of the majority of the SCA, stated that he too agreed 
that the ‘over-hasty or unreflective importation’ of the boni mores into the law of contract 
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should not be allowed.26 He held that the boni mores are ‘open to misinterpretation and 
misapplication’, and thus should be replaced with an objective standard informed by the 
Constitution.27 He also held that the courts do not have the power to strike down contracts on 
the ‘basis of judicially perceived notions of unjustness’.28 Cameron JA expressed the view 
that contractual autonomy is part of the constitutional value of freedom and gives effect to the 
value of dignity.29 
 
In effect, the consequence of the finding of the majority of the SCA is that the lessee and her 
dependants were evicted from their home, even though she was merely acting in accordance 
with the verbal agreement made with the lessor and had not taken the steps to reduce this 
verbal agreement to writing.30 As Barnard has observes, the finding of the SCA in this case 
shows the adverse consequences which the principle of freedom of contract and the strict 
adherence to the principles of contract law can have, especially if applied without 
consideration of the social and economic circumstances of the parties.31 The author 
emphasises the growing gap between the law of contract and justice, with the claim that 
judges are apparently choosing to follow the law at the expense of contractual justice.32 
 
4.4. Analysis of the finding of the Supreme Court of Appeal: 
On considering various cases which have been dealt with by the SCA in respect of the use of 
normative values in the South African law of contract, one can discern the courts emphasis on 
legal certainty as a motivation for preventing the use of normative values in the South 
African law of contract. 
 
Brand JA is not the first to mention the uncertainty that would arise if judges were given the 
discretion to interfere in contractual relationships, using nothing but normative values such as 
the boni mores, good faith, fairness etc. This is a long standing argument, with many people 
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expressing the fear of the uncertainty this could bring about. In the year 1907, Rudolf 
Leonhard, a German jurist, published a book in which he stated the following: 
‘There is something very alluring in the notion of elevating the judge to the position of 
custodian of morality and to let the Sword of Justice be guided by the voice of conscience. 
This may be appropriate to simple cultural stages, in which legal uncertainty is taken for 
granted.’33 
 
Schorer also opposed the idea of judges having the discretion to interfere in contractual 
relationships based on their sense of justice, stating that this idea is to be feared more than 
dogs and snakes.34 Acquilius was of the same opinion stating that if left to the sense of justice 
of the judge it would cause uncertainty in affairs.35 Acquilius stated that there is enough 
scope for a judge’s discretion; stating further that once this discretion is used in a manner 
which ‘usurps the rule of law’ it becomes nothing but arbitrary power.36  
 
Heusler stated that: 
‘Without a doubt, our ancestors would not have tolerated a law which delivered them to the 
discretion of a judge. Before invoking the courts at all they desired to be able to measure and 
calculate exactly what was in store for them if they engaged in litigation … an action of law 
should not be a lottery in which one is as likely to gamble away one’s suit as to win it’37   
 
Brand JA has stated that legal certainty is part of the principle of legality, which in turn forms 
part the rule of law, a founding value under the Constitution.38 This echoes a notion which 
was expressed by Harms JA, who stated that 'a constitutional principle that tends to be 
overlooked, when generalised resort to constitutional values is made, is the principle of 
legality. Making rules of law discretionary or subject to value judgments may be destructive 
of the rule of law.’39 
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This is said to be the reasoning behind the over-zealous protection of legal certainty, i.e. the 
SCA is protecting one of the founding values under the Constitution.40 The importance of 
legal certainty is not be undervalued, and there is no flaw in the SCA’s emphasis on the 
importance of upholding the rule of law,41 however, as Annor has stated, this is merely one of 
the many constitutional values which the courts are to consider, and the courts should not 
focus on this one value and completely disregard all the other constitutional values.42  
 
Kruger has identified that there is merit in the argument that legal certainty must be 
encouraged, however, stated that the argument that all commerce would be impossible 
without legal certainty is an exaggeration.43 He states further that certainty is not a 
consideration that should prevail over all other policy considerations.44 Kruger believes that if 
one looks past the exaggerations of uncertainty, there seems to be no other reason to refuse 
the application of normative values.45 The author makes it clear that the importance of legal 
certainty cannot be refuted, as doing so would amount to an argument against the foundation 
of the legal system.46 However, he argues that the sacrifice of some certainty, which will 
result from the use of normative values, is more than made up for by the substantive fairness 
that will be achieved through the use of the normative values.47 This is in line with the views 
expressed by Olivier J in Saayman.48 
 
Kruger states that the risk of uncertainty is present whenever law is ‘interpreted and applied’, 
even when it is not done in terms of open-ended values such as public policy and the boni 
mores.49 He states further that in other areas of law which employ such open-ended values, 
judicial steps are put in place to mitigate the degree of uncertainty caused by the use of such 
values, in order to ensure that it is within acceptable levels.50 There is no reason why such 
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steps cannot be used to enable the use of the boni mores in the law of contract.51 Louw has 
also identified how the boni mores has been used in other areas of law, stating that the law of 
delict uses the boni mores to determine the outcome of a case which relies primarily on the 
facts of the case, therefore the finding of the court depends on the circumstances of each case, 
yet despite this, delictual cases are dealt with as efficiently as contractual cases without the 
issue of uncertainty causing any significant problems.52 Also, Louw argues that the law of 
contract can learn a few things from the law of delict.53  As an example to illustrate this point 
one can look at the use of the boni mores in the South African law of delict as has been set 
out in chapter three of this dissertation.  
 
Bhana and Pieterse have argued that although the classical liberal model of contract law 
(focused on sanctity of contract, crystallised rules and consensus), brings about ‘objective 
certainty, predictability and efficiency’, it is just as important for the law of contract to 
embrace normative values such as ‘fairness, dignity and social equality’.54 The authors also 
argue that the uncertainty which will potentially be caused by the use of normative values has 
been exaggerated by the SCA, and they argue further that the uncertainty which will result 
can be mitigated by judicial precedent which will be developed by the courts and which will 
set out guidelines of how the principle will be applied, thereby giving a basic idea of how 
cases will go.55 
 
Lewis has stated that obtaining perfect certainty is not only an impossible achievement, but it 
is also an undesirable ideal.56 Lewis argues that all that is needed is that there be a sufficient 
degree of certainty.57 Pierre De Vos has argued that the fear of the courts regarding legal 
certainty is over-emphasised, stating that the idea that legal rules enable almost absolute 
certainty is in any event untrue and should not be allowed to stand.58 He argues further that if 
these legal rules really created such certainty no one would ever need to approach the courts 
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for their dispute to be heard, as the outcome could be easily determined by a legal expert.59
He argues that this is not a reality; legal rules do not create such certainty.60 O  this argument 
one can see that the courts have over-emphasised certainty, where there is no need to do so as 
there will always be a degree of uncertainty in the law, and the legal system still functions 
effectively. 
 
Louw has argued that once a proper understanding of the normative values, their nature and 
exact content has been developed it would reduce the fears of the legal uncertainty its 
application may cause.61 Bhana and Pieterse also cannot see the reasons why the courts have 
expressed such a need for certainty and why certainty has been given such an ‘elevated 
status’ in the law of contract.62 They argue this after observing that other fields of private law 
have completely incorporated social and economic considerations even though there has been 
a degree of uncertainty as a result.63 They argue that these social and economic 
considerations are reflected in the Constitution, and they believe that the law of contract is 
also required to adapt and embrace such considerations, irrespective of the fears of 
uncertainty that may result.64  
 
Louw has argued that the reason for the elevated status of legal certainty is that the courts 
continuously over-emphasise the intention of the parties, while failing to sufficiently make 
use of the legal convictions of the community when determining the enforceability of a 
contract.65 This position fails to take cognisance of the fact that the intention of the parties 
cannot and does not operate unrestrained. The intention of the parties must be lawful for the 
contract to be valid and enforceable.66 The legality doctrine employs the standards of the boni
mores, public policy and public interest to determine the lawfulness of a contract.67 Where a 
contract is contrary to such standards, or is contrary to the provisions of a statute, it will be 
deemed to be unenforceable.68 Therefore, as Louw has explained, it is the legal convictions of 
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the community, under the legality doctrine, which should determine the protection provided 
to the intention of the parties and whether such intention should be enforced.69 Therefore, it 
could be argued that whether one were to refer to the limitation placed on the intention of the 
parties as the boni mores or public policy, it may ultimately make little difference. 
 
Lubbe has identified that the use of all normative values, including public policy, will involve 
a degree of evaluative judgment on the part of the judge.70 He states further that by their 
nature these values do not set out strict and precise rules and do not dictate outcomes of the 
matter, rather these values allow judges to make value-judgments ‘with reference to pertinent 
considerations and broad guidelines’.71 
 
Davis believes that the call for the incorporation of constitutional values is not a call for 
judges to have the power to make subjective decisions:72 
“An argument in favour of seeking a reconciliation between freedom of contract and power 
rendered accountable to core constitutional values, should not be taken as a plea for 
unrestrained judicial activism which sweeps away legal arrangements in a cavalier fashion 
and thus supplants the role of the legislature. It is, however, an invitation to take seriously the 
constitutional demand to interrogate background rules.” 
This argument shows that even if normative values are incorporated into the law of contract 
in terms of the demands of the Constitution, no one is calling for judges to be allowed to 
make decisions based on their own notions of justice and fairness. Rather, section 39 (2) of 
the Constitution calls on the courts to interrogate the common law of contract in light of the 
Constitution and the values which underlie the Constitution.73 The constitutional duty of the 
courts to develop the common law will be discussed further in chapter five of this 
dissertation. 
 
Moseneke DCJ has acknowledged that the use of the Bill of Rights and constitutional values 
will lead to a degree of legal uncertainty in the law of contract; however, he continued: ‘I 
think that our courts are well-suited to ensure that the constitutionalisation of the common 
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law and of customary law occurs in an orderly and harmonious manner that would redound to 
the credit of our evolving and transformative constitutionalism.’ 74 Therefore it can be argued 
that the courts are more than capable to deal with any adverse effects that could result from 
the use of any of the normative values, and thus legal uncertainty, on its own, is an 
insufficient justification for the rejection of the use of normative values. 
 
The argument of the SCA that the boni mores cannot be used in the law of contract as it has 
been used in the law of delict because the two areas of law are too different, has been 
questioned by Alkema J. The judge in Siyepu and others v Premier, Eastern Cape75 has 
questioned whether the differences between the law of contract and the law of delict are 
significant enough to warrant such a refusal to incorporate the boni mores into the law of 
contract, stating that the two fields of law have many similarities. The first similarity which 
was identified is that both areas of law form part of the private law and they are two of the 
main sources of legal obligations.76 With both areas of law the performance or failure to 
perform an obligation can give rise to legal consequences, provided the requirements for each 
are established showing that such obligation is legally enforceable and protected.77 Also both 
areas of law require that the law recognise the obligation as legally enforceable and protected 
before a claim can be established, i.e. not every obligation will be legally enforceable just as 
every negligent or intentional act will not attract delictual liability.78 Alkema J does recognise 
the difference between the two areas of law, but states that these differences are not an issue 
as the enforceability of an obligation should depend on the wrongfulness, not intent, and that 
the differences do not affect the outcome of the enquiry.79 
 
Barnard-Naude has expressed dismay at the SCA’s line of reasoning in side-lining the 
normative value of good faith and emphasising the principle of freedom of contract. Barnard-
Naude believes that the SCA has argued that good faith is an underlying value, and as such 
cannot be invoked directly by the courts, however it goes on to say that freedom of contract is 
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also an underlying value but the courts consistently invoke freedom of contract directly.80 
Barnard-Naude has questioned why the SCA has taken such inconsistent approaches when it 
comes to the use of underlying contractual principles, and why freedom of contract can be 
invoked directly, but the same sentiment does not apply to normative values such as good 
faith.81  
 
Another issue which has been raised in respect of the approach of the SCA is the fact that it 
tried to limit the scope of operation of public policy. Lubbe has stated that the SCA appears 
to attempt to limit the application of public policy to contracts which are illegal, stating 
further that this means that public policy would only be applicable where the contract falls 
into categories which have already been established in the law of contract, not any other 
category which has not been established.82 Lubbe states further that the SCA even expressed 
doubts as to whether the principle set out in Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes,83 that a contract is 
contrary to public policy on the ground of ‘extreme unconscionability’, can be extended to 
give the courts the power to strike down contracts which are not in themselves illegal.84 This 
point goes back to the old argument that a judge should not be given the power to engage in 
subjective decision making, but rather that decisions should be based on the law.85 Lubbe 
believes that this contention by the SCA is not correct, stating that one cannot limit the 
application of public policy to pre-existing categories of illegality.86 Furthermore, he argues, 
that the idea that public policy can be applied to ‘analogous grounds is of crucial 
importance’.87 
 
The criticisms of the reasoning put forward by the SCA in the Brisley case raises doubts as to 
it correctness. It is clear that the emphasis put on legal certainty is misplaced, as is the 
argument that the law of delict and the law of contract are too different to allow the use of a 
principle used in the law of delict within the law of contract. Thus, this provides hope for the 
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incorporation of the boni mores into the law of contract, for if the Constitutional Court were 
to find the Brisley approach to be incorrect and contrary to the Constitution, many arguments 
can be made to justify the incorporation of normative values, such as the boni mores.  
 
However, for now it seems, as Davis has stated, that the classical liberal notions of legal 
certainty and private autonomy have triumphed over the ‘the constitutional imperative of 
transformation’ and ‘the core constitutional values of freedom, equality and dignity.’88 This is 
a worrying fact, especially in a constitutional dispensation which has called for 
transformation of all laws, including the common law, to ensure that all laws are in line with 
the demands of the Constitution. Bennett has commented on how sad this position is, 
especially considering the levels of inequality within our society and the fact that the law of 
contract sets the rules for the economic structure of society.89 
 
4.5. The intention of the parties:  
The courts use the concept of the intention of the parties to determine the enforceability of a 
contract. The parties to the contract must have the intention to be bound by the contract.90 
The intention of the parties is determined by examining the internal (i.e. the language and 
words used by the parties), and external context (i.e. the background to the contract and the 
surrounding circumstances).91 Therefore, the courts will attempt to identify the actual 
intention to contract, and then the court will consider the apparent intention to contract, this 
means that if one of the parties did not intend to contract, but merely created the reasonable 
impression that they had such intention, a contract will still come into effect.92 The 
impression could be created through words or conduct. Even where the parties have the 
requisite intention to enter into a contract, the contract will not be enforced where one of the 
parties were labouring under a reasonable mistake, or where the consensus was improperly 
obtained.93  
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Louw has stated that it appears that the rejection of the use of the boni mores by the SCA in 
Brisley was not based on the idea of the ‘application of an externally-imposed, value-based 
benchmark of contractual liability’, but was rather based on the SCA s predisposition to the 
intention of the parties as a primary determinant of the enforceability of the contract.94 
 
The use of the intention of the parties to determine the enforceability of a contract can, 
however, be problematic, as the intention will have been apparent at the time of contracting, 
not at the time of the enforcement of the contract, and often parties will deny that they had 
intention to contract or the intention to contract on such terms.95 Therefore, it is difficult to 
determine what the intentions of the parties were at the time the contract was created.96 
Wessels has explained that even though a meeting of the minds is required for the creation of 
a contract, the courts can only examine the external evidence.97 Th refore, Wessels explains 
further, that it is the ‘manifestation of their wills and not the unexpressed will which is of 
importance.’98 This is a view which Christie believes is a ‘fundamental truth’; he observes 
that the existence of consensus is determined through the search for ‘evidence of such 
agreement’ rather than searching for ‘agreement by consent’.99 These views basically mean 
that in determining the intention of the parties, the court does not know what the actual 
subjective intentions of the parties were at the time of contracting. Therefore, the court does 
not use the actual intention to determine the enforceability of the contract, but rather, the 
court will look at evidence and the surrounding circumstances which can provide proof of the 
intention. 
 
Louw has stated that the SCA’s argument that in the law of contract the parties determine the 
legal relationships and obligations, cannot be seen as completely correct, as the parties 
themselves cannot enter into an agreement that the law would not tolerate.100 Louw states 
further that the SCA has overemphasised the intention of the parties in determining the legal 
relationship between the parties, merely because the parties have a degree of influence on the 
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scope and nature of the legal relationship.101 Louw argues further that using the intention of 
the parties as a tool to determine the enforceability of the contract is not without difficulty as 
it too can be characterised by uncertainty and can cause inequity.102 
 
Bhana and Pieterse argue that consensus has become a generic principle, which the courts 
apply ‘indiscriminately’ without taking into account the circumstances and bargaining 
positions of the parties.103 They observe that there are certain cases in which the outcome 
does not conform with the demands of the Constitution despite the fact that ‘legitimate 
consensus’ is present.104 They argue that the role of consensus must be interrogated ‘in light 
of constitutional considerations of fairness, equality and human dignity.’105 The authors argue 
that over time the indiscriminate application of established contractual principles have 
resulted in the law of contract becoming ‘insensitive to the context in which it operates’.106 
Bhana and Pieterse also note how this results in there being consensus ‘in form but not in 
substance’.107 They recognise the fact that consensus is not always the result of negotiations 
of parties, who are on a more or less equal footing, but rather in situations where the one 
party is faced with the difficult decision of contracting on the terms set by the other party or 
to not contract at all.108 They argue that even though this has a potential to have serious 
implications on existence of true consensus, it continues to be seen as an insignificant issue in 
the law of contract.109 
 
Alkema J has observed that the common intention of the parties as a device to determine the 
enforceability of a contract is not useful, stating that it is ‘neither helpful on the facts of all 
cases, and nor is it as a matter of legal principle in my respectful view the correct tool to 
use.’110 Alkema J states further that the problem with the use of the intention of the parties is 
that it is concerned with the creation of the contract and the obligation under such contract, it 
is based on theories which are not related to the enforceability of an obligation under a 
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contractual agreement, arguing further that the enforceability of a contract should rather 
depend on the element of wrongfulness. He states that relying on the intention of the parties 
to determine the enforceability of an obligation is ‘illusionary and somewhat artificial’,111 
stating further that the use of the intention of the parties is ‘laborious’ and ‘circuitous’.112 He 
believes that determining the intention of the parties depends on the parties’ legal convictions 
at the time of contracting, as well as their legal convictions at the time the contract is to be 
enforced.113 This requires the courts to undertake an objective enquiry to determine what the 
legal convictions of the community are at the time of enforcement and then applying those 
convictions to the subjective intention of the parties’.114 He states that such enquiry will 
eventually bring the courts back to the wrongfulness enquiry, and that the wrongfulness of a 
contract will depend on the legal convictions of the community at the time the obligation is 
being enforced.115 On this understanding, it is not hard to see the possible parallels between 
the law of contract and the law of delict in the context of the application (or potential role) of 
the boni mores. 
 
Alkema J sets out an example of where the use of the intention of the parties to determine 
enforceability fails. The example is of a contract in which the one party agrees to buy illegal 
drugs manufactured by the other party; in such case both parties seriously intended to enter in 
to the contract but the contract would not be enforceable as it would fail to comply with the 
legality requirement.116 However, Alkema J takes the example further to question the 
circumstance in which the parties were not aware that their contract was illegal, but they fully 
intended to create the obligation- in such a case the intention of the parties will have no place 
and are completely irrelevant.117 It would still not affect the validity of an otherwise illegal 
agreement. He states that the wrongfulness enquiry goes further than merely actions which 
contravene legal principles, but includes conduct which would be regarded as ‘immoral, 
unethical and reprehensible’ in terms of the legal convictions of the community to such a 
degree that it requires judicial intervention.118 Thus it covers instances where the contract 
may be lawful, but where such contract is deemed wrongful and as such will not be 
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enforced.119 Alkema J acknowledges that the courts are bound by the precedent set by higher 
courts, i.e. the SCA, on the role of the intention of the parties in determining the 
enforceability of a contract.120 The judge himself states that the use of the wrongfulness 
element to determine the enforceability of a contract is a ‘bridge too far’ at the moment,121 
although it is submitted that this view has much to commend itself and that the SCA would 
do well to consider it in future. 
 
Van der Merwe has stated that ‘"simple justice between man and man" in the parties' 
individual capacities cannot alone determine the public interest, because the idea is too 
simplistic and could lead to arbitrary decisions.’122 Therefore one can argue that the intention 
of the parties at the time of contracting may be lawful, but might not always be in line with 
the public interest, and thus the intention of the parties should not be the sole determinant of 
enforceability of a contract. 
 
The intention of the parties also has the potential to be uncertain. Thus its usefulness, in 
determining the enforceability of the contract, is limited. Its usefulness is also limited because 
where the intention of the parties is determined and is deemed to be lawful the contract will 
be enforced, therefore certain wrongful contracts could possibly be enforced. This can be 
contrasted to the use of the boni mores and the wrongfulness enquiry; which would have any 
contracts which are ‘immoral, unethical and reprehensible’ declared as unenforceable; 
irrespective of its lawfulness. Thus, it is submitted, that the use of the boni mores could be of 
great assistance in preventing the enforcement of unjust, unreasonable or unfair contracts 
which our community would not approve of. Therefore, it is submitted further, that the 
intention of the parties should not be the sole determinant of the enforceability of a contract, 
but should rather form part of the enquiry into the enforceability of the contract, along with 
the boni mores. 
 
4.6. Conclusion: 
It is clear from the above discussion, that the SCA’s over-emphasis on legal certainty is 
misplaced, and that the alleged potential consequences of the use of normative values has 
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been seriously over-exaggerated. It is clear that the SCA has placed its focus on freedom of 
contract and the intention of the parties, while, to a large extent, it has ignored the normative 
values. 
 
Legal uncertainty has been feared for a long time, and has been cited by the SCA religiously 
to prevent the direct use of normative values in the South African law of contract. This 
position, despite the rigorous criticism it has received, has been maintained by the SCA in the 
cases which have been discussed in chapter three of this dissertation. Although, none of the 
commentators have denied the importance of legal certainty, it has been made clear by 
various academics that absolute legal certainty is not possible and that the legal uncertainty 
which will be caused by the use of normative values, would be outweighed by the benefits of 
substantive fairness and contractual justice which would be achieved through the use of such 
normative values.  
 
Many academics and certain judges have also identified how normative values, such as the 
boni mores, are used in other areas of law without any significant issues or implications for 
legal certainty. It has been made clear that the differences between the law of contract and the 
law of delict are of too insignificant a nature to qualify as a justification for the refusal to use 
the boni mores in the law of contract. Also, academics have argued that the courts would, 
over time, develop judicial precedent which would set out how the normative values are to be 
applied, thus reducing the legal uncertainty that would result from the use of normative 
values. 
 
The intention of the parties, although it is an important factor in the determination of the 
enforceability of a contract, should not be the only or predominant tool used to determine 
enforceability. It is also susceptible to uncertainty. The use of the intention of the parties 
alone is of little help. This is because if the intention of the parties is determined, provided it 
is lawful, it will be enforced. This allows space for wrongful and inequitable contracts to be 
enforced, especially since the boni mores is currently not available as a mechanism to refuse 
the enforcement of such contract. On considering the criticisms of the Brisl y judgment, and 
the SCA’s excessive reliance on the intention of the parties and the principles of freedom and 
sanctity of contract, one can question whether the approach of the SCA is in line with the 




The South African law of contract and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa: 
 
‘I cannot accept this contention which treats the common law as a body of law separate and 
distinct from the Constitution. There are not two systems of law… There is only one system 
of law. It is shaped by the Constitution which is the supreme law, and all law, including the 
common law, derives its force from the Constitution and is subject to constitutional control.’1 
 
5.1. Introduction: 
The Constitution is the supreme law in South Africa,2 and as such all law must be interpreted, 
applied and developed in a manner which gives effect to the Constitution and the values 
which underlie it.3 Section 39 (2) of the Constitution requires the courts to develop the 
common law where it is inconsistent with the Constitution.  
 
Bhana has stated that ‘[t]he Constitution embodies the substantively progressive and 
transformative, socio-economic goals of post-apartheid South African society, and 
furthermore, expressly subjects all law, including the common law of contract, to this 
vision.’4 Therefore it is clear that the law of contract is subject to constitutional scrutiny, and 
if found to be contrary to the Constitution or any of the values which underlie it, the common 
law of contract must be developed so as to bring it in line with the Constitution. Bhana also 
states that the Constitution has started the movement ‘away from liberalism toward a more 
substantive recognition of “human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement 
of human rights and freedoms”.’5 
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As Louw has argued, the new constitutional dispensation, comprising of the Bill of Rights 
and underlying values, provides one of the greatest motivations for adapting the common law 
of contract by providing normative values with a greater role in the law of contract.6  
 
In this chapter a discussion will be undertaken of the duty of the courts to develop the 
common law, and an investigation into whether or not the courts have fulfilled this duty in 
light of cases which have been dealt with by the SCA. Lastly a discussion will be undertaken 
to determine whether or not the law of contract in its current form in respect of the issues 
under investigation here is in line with the Constitution. 
 
5.2. Duty of the courts to develop the common law:  
‘Courts have not only the right but also the duty to develop the common law, taking into 
account the interests of justice and at the same time to promote the spirit, purport and objects 
of the Bill of Rights.’7 
 
The courts have the constitutional obligation to develop the common law in terms of section 
39 (2) of the Constitution to ensure that such common law is in line with the Constitution. 
The Constitutional Court, in the case of Barkhuizen v Napier,8 has stated that no law is 
immune to constitutional scrutiny, and that the common law of contract is no exception to 
this.9 As a result the courts have a duty to develop the common law to bring all laws in line 
with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.10 The leading case dealing with the 
development of the common law in light of the Constitution is the case of Carmichele v 
Minister of Safety and Security11(a case on the law of delict), in which Ackermann and 
Goldstone JJ stated that: 
‘the obligation of courts to develop the common law, in the context of the s 39(2) objectives, 
is not purely discretionary. On the contrary it is implicit in s39(2) read with s 173 that where 
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the common law as it stands is deficient in promoting the s39(2) objective, the Courts are 
under a general obligation to develop it appropriately.’12 
  
Hawthorne has stated that the Constitution requires: 
‘a reappraisal of traditional ideas of the judicial function and of legal interpretation. It requires 
judges to engage in substantive legal reasoning, to articulate the values upon which their 
decisions are based and to engage with the social, historical and legislative context. Judges 
themselves are thus made subject to the demand for justification: rather than simply relying 
on a pre-existing rule or precedent, they are required to engage in value-based, contextual 
reasoning.’13 
 
In other words, under the new constitutional dispensation, the courts are required to re-
evaluate the manner in which they decide cases so as to ensure that such decision making is 
in line with the Constitution. They cannot merely continue to follow the principles and 
precedent which existed before the emergence of the Constitution. In the case of Du Plessis 
and Others v De Klerk and Another14 Kentridge AJ, relying on a Canadian case, stated that 
'judges can and should adapt the common law to reflect the changing social, moral and 
economic fabric of the country. Judges should not be quick to perpetuate rules whose social 
foundation has long since disappeared.’15 
 
Davis has stated that the rules that ‘underpin social and economic life need to be interrogated 
to ensure that they are congruent with the constitutional values of the text.’16 Davis states 
further that the courts have been given substantial power and responsibility to ‘interrogate the 
law and, if necessary, change principles of common and customary law so as to promote the 
values expressed in the Bill of Rights.’17 Davis argues that the development clause in the 
Constitution18 requires the courts to interrogate and develop the common law to promote the 
spirit and object of the Bill of Rights and to ‘establish a society based on social justice’, 
which can be achieved through the infusion of normative values.19 
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Davis has noted how there is always a need to develop the common law to enable it to 
correspond with the needs of society.20 This development also requires that the existing 
common law principle be applied in a different way.21 Frank Michelman has stated that the 
Constitution is progressive and is striving for a just society, a goal which is to be achieved 
through ‘political and other means under the Constitution’s guidance and control’.22  
 
Mokgoro has stated that the constitutional value of Ubuntu should be used in the process of 
developing the common law.23 Yacoob J has held that the notion of Ubuntu is relevant when 
developing the common law, while Moseneke J has held that the law of contract must be 
infused with constitutional values, such as Ubuntu.24 From the above discussion it is more 
than clear that the courts have a positive obligation to develop the common law in light of the 
spirit, object and purport of the Bill of Rights. The courts are tasked with developing the 
common law, having regard to the Bill of Rights, the prevailing morals of society and the 
notion of Ubuntu. 
 
5.3. Approach of the courts to the development of the common law: 
It has been made clear on various occasions that the court is under an obligation to develop 
the common law to ensure that it embraces the Constitution and the values which underlie it. 
Despite this obligation the law of contract has remained somewhat resistant to the calls for 
transformation under the new constitutional dispensation. This position has been maintained 
by the SCA, whose unwavering devotion to freedom of contract and legal certainty and its 
steadfast opposition to the use of normative values to interfere in contractual relationships, 
has resulted in the lack of a substantive defence which is based upon equity.25 
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In the Brisley case the SCA ‘situated the existing common law of contract within the 
constitutional context’,26 with Cameron JA stating that the common law of contract is subject 
to the Bill of Rights and must be developed where necessary, and recognising public policy 
as the appropriate mechanism to bring the common law of contract in line with the 
Constitution.27 Cameron JA stated that freedom of contract is a part of the constitutional 
value of freedom and gives effect to the value of dignity by allowing people to control their 
lives.28 Cameron JA stated further that in the absence of ‘obscene excess’ contractual 
autonomy must be upheld.29 Barnard-Naude has identified how the judgment of Cameron JA 
is founded on individualism and assumes that the enforcement of the common law principles 
of freedom and sanctity of contract is ‘in service of the constitutional values of dignity, 
equality and freedom.’30 Barnard-Naude states that this judgment is not in line with the ideals 
of the Constitution,31 arguing further that the standpoint taken in the Brisley case ‘represents 
a static, closed view of a legal system’.32 
 
Following suit, the SCA in the case of Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom33 again gave 
preference to freedom of contract by placing this principle in a privileged position.34 The 
SCA stated that the constitutional value of equality is seldom relevant as the contracting 
parties are assumed to be in equal bargaining positions, and that only where evidence of 
unequal bargaining is presented, would the court consider this as a factor in determining the 
enforceability of the contract.35 
 
Bhana believes that the SCA has undoubtedly shown its allegiance to the ideas under the 
classical liberal model of contract law, giving preference to ‘self-interest, self-reliance and 
self-determination’.36 Bhana states that: 
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“The cases, despite ostensibly aligning the common law of contract with the Bill of Rights, 
seem to leave contract law largely intact and unaffected by the Bill of Rights, often with 
results that appear to be patently unfair to individual contractants and inimical to the 
transformative aspirations of the Constitution.”37 
She believes further that the law of contract has remained unreceptive to the demands of the 
Constitution, and has consistently failed to engage with the Bill of Rights.38 Bhana states 
further that the policy considerations employed by the courts strengthen the classical liberal 
model in the South African law of contract.39  
 
Bhana has noted that even when considering the constitutional values of equality, freedom 
and dignity the courts continue to follow a classical liberal interpretation, and explains that 
even the public policy enquiry is very individualised.40 Bhana states that the underlying ideas 
of the law of contract must be interrogated as they are now required to operate within the 
confines of the Constitution.41 As was stated in chapter two of this dissertation, our modern 
model of contract law is heavily influenced by the classical liberal model. It is primarily 
focused on freedom and sanctity of contract, meaning that the courts will generally enforce 
contracts in most cases, apart from those which are deemed to be contrary to public policy.42 
However, even the use of public policy, as a mechanism to control the operation of freedom 
and sanctity of contract, can in many cases be insufficient to provide for the substantive 
fairness which the Constitution calls for, a clear example being the Brisley and Afrox cases. 
This is because public policy has a limited scope of operation.43  Naude and Lubbe have 
observed how the principle emerging from the Sasfin judgment has been so restricted by the 
SCA in the Brisley case that one could say that public policy is not of much use to control 
unfair contracts ‘beyond its well-established application in respect of wilful wrongdoing.’44 
Therefore, it could be argued that many people will find no protection from unfair contracts 
in the law of contract, in its undeveloped form. 
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In the case of Barkhuizen v Napier45 the majority of the Constitutional Court stated that the 
test for the validity of a contract is that of public policy, stating that ‘public policy represents 
the legal convictions of the community; it represents those values that are held most dear by 
the society…public policy is now deeply rooted in our Constitution and the values that 
underlie it’.46 Therefore, whether a contract is contrary to public policy must be determined 
with reference to the constitutional values.47 The Constitutional Court stated further that it 
was unsure whether the limited role of the normative value of good faith in contract law is 
acceptable under the new constitutional dispensation, and stated (with apparent relief) that it 
was not necessary to make a pronouncement on the issue.48 This shows that there is doubt as 
to whether the limited role played by normative values is consistent with the demands of the 
Constitution, but the Constitutional Court failed to take positive steps to settle the issue but 
rather left it for the next court to deal with. However, the judgment was not without issue. 
Davis has stated that the Constitutional Court failed to interrogate the current understanding 
of freedom of contract, and as a result contractual autonomy continues to be the primary 
focus for the law of contract.49  
 
Davis declares that ‘having taken us to the constitutional door, the Court refused to enter the 
new venue’, but he expresses relief that the Constitutional Court has at least opened the 
opportunity for the further incorporation of normative values into the law of contract.50 Kerr 
observes that, because of the finding of the Constitutional Court in Barkhuizen v Napier51 the 
finding of the SCA in the Brisley case must be taken as being wrongly decided as the 
Constitution has given the courts a more prominent role with a wider ‘field of operation’ than 
it had in the pre-constitutional era.52  
 
However the more recent case of Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers 
(Pty) Ltd,53 gives us a glimmer of hope that the courts are beginning to embrace the demands 
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of the Constitution, calling for the use of constitutional values such as Ubuntu to assist in the 
transformation of the common law of contract. Yacoob J, in Everfresh,54 stated that the 
values encompassed by the notion of Ubuntu are relevant in the development of the common 
law, as its development must acknowledge the values of the majority of people who will take 
part in it.55 He expressed the view that the law of contract cannot be restricted solely to 
colonial traditions.56 Yacoob J stated that the notion of Ubuntu is normally implicated in most 
contracts, as even when the contract is between two business entities, it is ultimately between 
individuals who are generally in different bargaining positions.57 Yacoob J stated further that: 
“a court should always be alive to the possibility of the development of the common law in 
the light of the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. The development of the 
common law would otherwise be no more than a distant dream. A court should always be at 
pains to discover whether the development of the common law is implicit in a case.” 58 
 
In the same case, Moseneke DCJ stated that ‘it is highly desirable and in fact necessary to 
infuse the law of contract with constitutional values, including values of Ubuntu, which 
inspire much of our constitutional compact.’59 Moseneke DCJ stated further that the value of 
Ubuntu could sway the courts to find in favour of normative values, such as good faith, which 
was being considered in this case. 
 
One can see the different approach taken by the Constitutional Court, with it emphasizing the 
use of the notion of Ubuntu, development of the common law and hinting towards the 
possibility of providing normative values with a greater role in the law of contract. This was 
identified by Barnard-Naude, who stated that the approaches taken in both the majority and 
minority judgments in Everfresh is in opposition to precedent which had been set by the SCA 
which has been opposed to the use of normative values as independent grounds to interfere in 
the contractual relationship.60 He believes that the judgments show the possibility that the 
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role of normative values as set out by the SCA may be constitutionally inappropriate.61 Louw 
has also stated that Everfresh is in line with the movement which emphasises ‘fairness and 
the pursuit of contractual justice’.62 In the more recent case of Botha and Another v Rich NO 
and Others,63 the Constitutional Court held that where the rigid application of the principle of 
reciprocity would result in an injustice, our law of contract, based on good faith, is 
sufficiently flexible to achieve fairness.64 It held further that the ‘honouring’ of a contract 
cannot be focused on one’s own self-interest, while having no regard for the interests of the 
other party.65 The Constitutional Court explained that this understanding of contract law is 
founded upon the normative value of good faith.66 From this one can see the greater reliance 
on the normative value of good faith (and, in respect of the court’s sentiments regarding 
consideration of the interests of the counter-party, an indication of implicit support for what 
was said in Everfresh regarding the role of Ubuntu).  
 
Thus a change could possibly be around the corner, all that is required is for the appropriate 
case, which has been pleaded correctly, to come before the Constitutional Court , which one 
can only hope will follow the approaches taken by Yacoob J and Moseneke DCJ in 
Everfresh,67 as opposed to the approach of the SCA. 
 
From this it can be argued that the SCA has continuously failed to fulfil its constitutional 
mandate to ensure that all areas of law embrace the constitutional values,68 and as Barnard 
has stated, the SCA can even be said to be shying away from the Constitution.69 Bar ard has 
noted further that the SCA has merely continued the tradition of providing ‘individualistic 
rules’ with preference.70 Davis has remarked how this ‘has produced islands of “private law 
purity” in a sea of constitutional transformation.’71 As stated by Davis, the courts ‘have been 
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overly cautious in addressing the tension between the value of certainty (which is central to 
the rule of law) and the constitutional imperative of transformation’. 72 
 
Annor argues that although the courts must ensure legal certainty they must act in accordance 
with the constitutional obligation to develop the common law, an obligation which the courts 
cannot elude by ‘passing the buck’ from one court to another, as the SCA has done.73 Just as 
the SCA has warned that the courts cannot hide behind the Constitution when overthrowing 
common law principles, Louw has stated that on the same notion the courts also cannot hide 
behind the common law principles to avoid its constitutional obligation to develop the 
common law and simply pass the task on to the next court.74 Louw has argued that the 
approach of the SCA thus far has been too conservative and is not in line with the 
Constitution.75 
 
Davis argues that the Brisley case, and those which follow its findings, have only referred to 
the Constitution as an afterthought without attempting to engage the law of contract with 
constitutional values, arguing that the courts have failed to meet the challenge set by the 
Constitution and failed to fulfill the mandate set out in the case of Carmichele v Minister of 
Safety and Security76 where the Constitutional Court stated that the courts have the duty to 
develop the common law to bring it in line with the Constitution.77 He also argues that the 
courts have not given a reason as to why they believe the normative values are so vague that 
they cannot be used independently in the law of contract as compared to the concept of public 
policy.78 
 
As stated in earlier chapters, some commentators have noted how the law of contract can 
learn something from the law of delict. The law of delict has fully embraced the demands of 
the Constitution. In the law of delict ‘substantive fairness and justice’ is of the utmost 
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importance, and it has been aligned with the Constitution.79 Bhana and Pieterse have stated, 
in respect of the law of delict, that ‘it is in fact not uncommon in law for the policy objective 
of legal certainty to be relaxed in circumstances where competing social considerations and 
the development of the common law warrant it.’80 Furthermore they set out the example of 
the test for wrongfulness, stating that this test is based on the boni mores, and they argue that 
this test completely embraces ‘competing social and economic considerations (including 
those reflected in the Constitution), notwithstanding the inevitable reduction in legal 
certainty.’81 Bhana and Pieterse argue that the law of contract is also supposed to embrace the 
normative and constitutional values, stating that this fact makes it difficult to understand why 
legal certainty has been elevated above the normative values.82 
 
However as Davis has argued, although the SCA has made its position abundantly clear, one 
must not make the mistake to believe that the door is forever closed.83 This statement appears 
accurate in light of Everfresh,84where the Constitutional Court emphasised the need to infuse 
the law of contract with constitutional values and highlighted the fact that the courts must 
never be hesitant to develop the common law where it is deficient. This shows a movement 
from adherence to the classical liberal model, towards a new system of contract law, infused 
with the Constitution and the values which underlie it, and one which places an emphasis on 
fairness and equity and not merely the principles of legal certainty and freedom and sanctity 
of contract. 
 
5.4. The role of the boni mores in light of the Constitution: 
Barnard believes that the demands of the Constitution call for more than a ‘blind reliance on 
freedom of contract as the basis of contractual relationships’.85 Barnard states further that 
what the Constitution requires is a ‘review, adaption, reinterpretation and expansion’ of the 
current role of the boni mores, and other normative values, in the law of contract, which will 
facilitate the alignment between the principles of the common law of contract and the ‘new 
                                                            
79
 Bhana (note 4 above) 33. 
80
 D Bhana and M Pieterse ‘Towards a reconciliation of the contract law and the constitutional values: Brisley 
and Afrox revisited’ (2005) 122 4 SALJ 894-895 
81
 Ibid 894-895 
82
 Ibid 894-895. 
83
 Davis (note 16 above) 318. 
84
 Everfresh (note 53 above). 
85
 A J Barnard ‘A critical legal argument for contractual justice in the South African law of contract’ 
(Unpublished LLD thesis, University of Pretoria, 2005) 144. 
64 
 
boni mores of the constitutional community’.86 Barnard believes that what judges are now 
obliged to ask is whether the enforcement of freedom of contract is in line with the 
constitutional values.87 
 
Barnard-Naude has also argued that the notion of Ubuntu can be used to infuse constitutional 
values into the law of contract. According to the author, the Constitution, just like the notion 
of Ubuntu, requires parties to act with respect and consideration towards the other contracting 
party; he argues further that this requires the courts to provide normative values with further 
recognition in the law of contract.88 This is where the concept of Ubuntu plays a role in 
calling for normative values to play a greater role, as Ubuntu requires people to treat each 
other with respect, and this is something that the boni mores can ensure in the law of contract 
by requiring the parties to treat each other with a minimum standard of respect and to act in a 
manner which is fair and reasonable. 
 
As Louw has stated, the Constitution and its underlying values are the greatest motivations 
for incorporating normative values into the law of contract.89 All courts have the duty to 
develop the common law where it is deficient to ensure that it is in line with the Constitution. 
As per this duty, the courts must develop the common law of contract. The law of contract in 
its current position does not embrace the demands of the Constitution and continues to 
perpetuate the individualistic ideology which has allowed serious injustices within the law of 
contract and has inhibited the infusion of constitutional values into the law of contract. The 
Constitution strives for the ideal of a ‘civic friendship’ which calls people to relate to each 
other with respect and consideration,90 but, it is submitted, this is something which the law of 
contract presently does not provide for. 
 
As can be seen from the definition of the boni mores in chapter two, it is a concept which 
encompasses the morals of a community and the values of justice, equity and reasonableness. 
It has also been said that the Bill of Rights is the embodiment of the boni mores.91 The boni 
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mores sets out an objective standard of conduct, based on the legal convictions of the 
community, which all contracting parties should comply with. Thus is it difficult to 
comprehend how the Constitution would not welcome a mechanism such as the boni mores 
which could bring the law of contract in line with the demands of the Constitution, by 
providing a substantive contractual defense to facilitate contractual justice, equity and 
fairness and which can be employed to enable the incorporation of other normative values, 
such as good faith.92 The fact that the Constitution calls for the transformation of all laws to 
reflect a society which is founded on the values of dignity, freedom and equity, makes the 
current role of the normative values even more puzzling, as one can ask what better to 
achieve such a society than the employment of values which require people to treat others 
with mutual respect and concern. 
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6.1. Revision of the chapters: 
The boni mores is a concept which reflects the morals of a society, and requires people to 
comply with the objective standard it sets out. It encompasses the community’s ideas of 
justice, equity and reasonableness, as well as the ‘legal… ethical, moral, and social values’ of 
a community.1 It represents minimum standards which are morally binding, standards which 
are required for the society to exist peacefully. Although this concept is similar to that of 
public policy, it is submitted that they are in fact separate concepts and as such should not be 
used interchangeably as this fails to take cognisance of the differences between the concepts. 
Public policy is more of an all-encompassing concept which consists of not only the boni 
mores, but also good faith, reasonableness, fairness and justice, thus applying to a wider 
scope of contracts and contracts which might not fit into other categories of invalidity. 
Whereas the boni mores have a limited scope of application merely to cases which infringe 
upon the fundamental morals of a society and its sense of reasonableness, justice and equity.2 
However, irrespective of the conclusion one comes to in relation to the relationship between 
the boni mores and public policy, it would not impact upon the underlying argument of this 
study, namely that an equity mechanism is needed in the law of contract, as the common law 
of contract in its current state is deficient and requires development to enable it to meet the 
demands of the Constitution as well as to be able to address the vast number of issues which 
plague South African societies and may be ameliorated through a more fair law of contract.3 
 
From the discussion in the preceding chapters, it is clear that the current role of the b ni 
mores in the South African law of contract is virtually non-existent, as it is apparently 
believed that the importation of the boni mores into the law of contract will cause too much 
uncertainty. The fear of uncertainty has been the primary – in fact, only - reason advanced so 
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often by the SCA for its constant rejection of the use of normative values in an attempt to 
achieve substantive fairness in the South African law of contract.  
 
However the reasoning of the SCA has been subjected to a great deal of criticism. The 
contention by the SCA that the use of the boni mores in the law of contract will cause 
unacceptable uncertainty has been refuted by many academics and some judges. Although no 
one has denied the importance of legal certainty, many have noted how the fear of uncertainty 
and the alleged consequences thereof, advanced by the SCA, is an exaggeration. It is clear 
that in all areas of law there is always a degree of uncertainty, and as De Vos has recognised, 
if there was no uncertainty when it came to the law there would be no need for the courts as 
people would always know what the outcome of the case would be, thus it would be pointless 
to bring the case before a court. Also, many have argued that if the courts are given the 
opportunity, they could develop guidelines as to how such normative values are to be applied, 
thereby decreasing the uncertainty that would result. It has also been argued that the 
incorporation of normative values is not a call for judges to be given an unrestrained 
discretion to interfere in contractual relationships, but rather for judges to be given a degree 
of discretion that will enable them to address issues using the concept of the b ni mores as is 
done in the law of delict. Another argument is that the boni mores is used in other areas of 
law and there is no significant difficulty when dealing with most cases or any severe 
consequence in relation to the uncertainty it may cause in hard cases. 
 
Furthermore, the argument that the law of delict and law of contract are too different to allow 
the use of the boni mores in the law of contract has been addressed by Alkema J. The judge 
made it clear that the two areas of law are extremely similar and has shown how the slight 
differences between the two would make no difference to the application of the boni mores in 
relation to the law of contract and would not affect the outcome of the enquiry. 
 
This study has also set out how the use the intention of the parties to determine the 
enforceability of a contract is not an appropriate determinant as it is too subjectively focused 
and prone to uncertainty, and because the intention of the parties cannot be the sole 
determinant as the parties cannot enter into a contract which would be regarded as illegal. 
This is a well-established principle of our law. In such cases the intention of the parties is 
completely irrelevant; even if they intended to enter into such a contract, the contract would 
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be invalid on the ground of illegality. Alkema J also highlighted how the use of the intention 
of the parties is pointless as one reaches the same conclusion using the wrongfulness enquiry, 
which is a far less onerous enquiry.  
 
This study investigated the constitutional duty of the courts to develop the common law and 
set out how our courts have approached this duty to date. From the decisions of the SCA in 
certain judgments4 it is clear that the court has failed to fulfil its constitutional to develop the 
common law to ensure that it embraces the ideals and values of the Constitution. The courts 
have merely referred to the Constitution when discussing public policy as a determinant for 
the enforceability of a contract, and when justifying its predilection for the principles of 
freedom and sanctity of contract, arguing that freedom of contract has become a 
constitutional value and gives effect to the constitutional value of dignity. Beyond this 
reference to the Constitution the common law of contract has remained largely unaffected by 
the Constitution.  
 
Lastly, the study examined whether the limited role of the boni mores is consistent with the 
Constitution. The calls by our Constitution for transformation have remained largely 
unanswered in the law of contract, with the modern model of contract being heavily 
influenced by the classical liberal model. The classical liberal model focused on 
individualism and procedural fairness, while relegating substantive fairness to an apparently 
negligible role. This is a position which cannot be allowed by the Constitution, thus the 
limited role of normative values which could address such issues, as currently ascribed to by 
the SCA,  cannot be said to be in line with the Constitution.  
 
 6.2. Conclusion: 
Although previously the law of contract was focused on freedom and sanctity of contract one 
can see a movement towards a more ‘altruistic vision’.5 This is can be seen through the 
enactment of statutes such as the Consumer Protection Act6 and he findings of certain courts 
which have called for normative values to play a greater role in the law of contract. The 
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Consumer Protection Act is just one example which has shown a movement away from the 
strict application of common law principles, where such application would be contrary to the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution.7 The Consumer Protection Act, and other 
legislation,8 can be seen as reflecting the ‘current legal convictions of the legislature’ in 
respect of the regulation of unfair contracts in specified areas, for example consumer 
contracts.9 Its purpose is to address unfair consumer contracts, and in fulfilling this purpose 
the Consumer Protection Act often limits the parties’ freedom to contract where the contract 
is in anyway inimical to the purposes of the Act.10 
 
However this movement has been hindered by the SCA which has, while clinging to the 
ideals of the classical contract law, refused to acknowledge the need for the normative values 
to address issues of substantive fairness and contractual justice. It is argued that the stance 
that has been taken by the SCA seems to be incorrect and illogical, especially if one considers 
the reasons put forward as a justification for refusing to provide the boni mores more traction 
in this context.  
 
One such reason, as has been stated previously, is the uncertainty it would cause. This reason 
is not only illogical on the ground that many have refuted it as being a severely exaggerated 
concern which is insufficient to justify the SCA’s refusal, but also because the courts have 
time and again stated that public policy is the test to be used to determine the enforceability 
of a contract. The problem with this reasoning is that, as was stated in chapter two of this 
study, public policy itself has not been free of criticism for causing legal uncertainty, with 
both values encompassing similar ideals and values. So this begs the question of how the 
SCA can justify its acceptance of one value over another where both have been subjected to 
the same criticism.11 This issue was noted by Kroeze who states that the court’s contention 
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that public policy and the constitutional values are more real and precise than the boni mores 
is ‘nonsense’, as the constitutional values are no more real or precise than the bo i mores.12 
 
Another concern regarding the SCA’s reasoning is its over-emphasis on the principle of 
freedom of contract and the use of the intention of the parties to determine the enforceability 
of a contract. This ideology fails to take into account the social circumstances in which 
people find themselves at the time of contracting; significantly, it leaves little room to address 
the widespread use of contracts to achieve abuse of private power (which, many would argue, 
is inimical to our constitutional value system and, especially, Ubuntu). Consider that, if a 
person has virtually no choice but to enter into a contract, and due to such necessity they are 
not in the position to bargain so they are forced to accept whatever terms and conditions are 
imposed by the other party, that person may still have entered into the contract not labouring 
under any form of mistake, misrepresentation or duress (and may well have the intention to 
enter into such a contract). But one must ask whether this contract was entered into freely.13 
A common example of such a situation is contracts entered into between a patient and a 
hospital, if the patient is ill or injured and requires medical attention they are in no position 
bargain in an attempt to alter the terms of the contract.14 If the patient refuses to accept the 
terms set by the hospital, the hospital could, in certain situations, refuse to contract with that 
patient. 
 
The same issue is evident with many of the examples identified by the South African Law 
Commission in its discussion paper on unfair contract terms.15 This problem is amplified by 
the socio-economic circumstances in South Africa. Du Plessis has identified the need for a 
mechanism in the South African law of contract which can ‘safeguard against inequity in 
contractual relationships’.16 Thus, as Louw has argued, it is in this context that one can argue 
that some kind of mechanism is needed in the law of contract which can subject freedom of 
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contract to a form of social control, and that the boni mores, being a ‘source for ethical 
standards’, is more than capable of performing such a task.17 This becomes more desirable 
especially since a number of commentators have commented on the fact that the courts 
appear to have recognised that the legal convictions of the community impose standards of 
fairness and reasonableness on contracting parties in the light of the constitutional values,18 
with Alkema J remarking that the boni mores covers acts which are ‘immoral, unethical and 
reprehensible’,19 and Bhana and Pieterse remarking how it encompasses considerations 
reflected in the Constitution.20  
 
It is not suggested that judges should be given the discretion to make decisions on what they 
believe is morally correct or on their own sense of justice; as was stated by Sachs J, ‘the legal 
convictions of the community should not be equated with the convictions of the legal 
community’.21 As was highlighted in chapter four, Davis feels that the call for the 
incorporation of constitutional values is not a call for judges to have the power to make 
subjective decisions, but is rather a call for the re-evaluation of the contractual rules in 
accordance with the Constitution.22  
 
As Louw has noted, the courts should not emphasise ‘fairness in the circumstances of any 
given case’, and that rather the ‘emphasis should be on an objectively verifiable ethical 
standard of conduct in contracting’, therefore the enforceability of the contract will not be 
determined in terms of the judge’s idea of fairness, but would rather be based on whether the 
boni mores would tolerate such a contract.23  
 
Another objection to the approach of the SCA is that simply it fails to meet the demands of 
the Constitution. Barnard-Naude has stated that the Constitution has given us the chance to 
interrogate and challenge the common law of contract24- a task which the courts have failed 
to undertake. As Bhana and Pieterse have noted, the courts seem to assume that the common 
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law and legal certainty is sufficient to bring about contractual fairness and justice, and that as 
a result the law of contract need not be altered.25 
 
Upon considering the variety of criticisms set out against the SCA’s decision in the Brisley 
case (and those that followed it as referred to above), it seems safe to assume that not only is 
this judgment (and the court’s approach on these issues) seriously flawed, but it is probably 
incorrect. This is especially poignant if one considers recent judgments from other courts 
(including both the lower courts as well as the Constitutional Court), who have made 
statements which appear to be in opposition to the findings of the SCA. With certain 
judgments which have been passed recently, one can see that the movement toward 
substantive fairness and contractual justice, which had to a significant extent been halted by 
the SCA, seems to be re-emerging.26 
 
A last factor to consider is the question why, if the law of contract already possesses the 
mechanism of public policy, why would another mechanism be needed? This is a simple 
issue to address, irrespective of whether one considers the boni mores and public policy to be 
the same or separate and dissimilar concepts. The simple answer is that thus far the use of 
public policy, although proving to be an invaluable tool to determine the enforceability of a 
contract, has been inadequate to provide sufficiently for substantive equity and fairness as its 
scope of operation is also limited. As a result many unfair, unreasonable and harsh contracts 
may be falling through the cracks.27 Barnard-Naude has noted that as a result of the judgment 
in the landmark case of Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes28 public policy may only be used by the 
courts in the clearest of cases, Barnard-Naude has argued that as a further result only the 
‘worst features of the system can be held in check’.29 Also Naude and Lubbe have observed 
how public policy, as it emerged from the Sasfin case,30  has been so restricted by the SCA in 
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Brisley, that public policy is not of much use as it can only be applied where such application 
is well-established, and not to unestablished applications.31 
 
Van der Merwe has identified how even where a contract is unfair, unreasonable or operates 
harshly, this does not mean that a court will find the contract to be contrary to public policy.32 
Davis has also identified how the courts have referred to public policy as ‘a ritual incantation 
of the existence of the Constitution before moving on to deal with the "real" law of 
contract.’33 It is submitted that this shows that a different mechanism is needed to deal with 
the specific issues of unfair, unreasonable or harsh contracts that the Constitution and its 
underlying values would not tolerate, and it is submitted that the boni mores is the ideal 
mechanism to do so, as it calls for a moral standard to be followed by the contracting parties. 
No community would wish for such unfair, unreasonable or harsh contracts to be enforced, a 
view which would be reflected in the boni mores. This is even more true in the context of our 
society which is based on our transformational and developmental Constitution. 
 
Our system of contract law, as it stands, has not met the transformative demands of our 
Constitution. As Louw has observed, as it currently stands the law of contract ‘in effect, 
places in the hands of the economically powerful in society a potential weapon of mass 
destruction.’34 Louw has argued that it is unimaginable that our society would not strive 
towards a law of contract which is fairer and ‘in which mutual respect and mutual 
responsibility towards the other’ is of the utmost importance.35 Barnard-Naude has 
acknowledged that the courts’ refusal to incorporate normative values into the law of contract 
and failure to ‘accept the ethical element to contract as a foundational value’ is a sign of a 
‘deeper illness’.36 This illness, it is submitted, may well be cured through the incorporation of 
the boni mores and the other normative values. As Bhana has noted, these values are the 
principal tools which may be used to ensure the ‘exercise of social control over contractual 
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autonomy’,37 stating further that where the exercise of freedom of contract unreasonably or 
unjustifiably disregards the rights of another, then the principle of freedom of contract must 
be limited.38 As has previously been identified, the Bill of Rights recognises that there is 
often a need to balance the interests of the parties, which may demand such limitation of the 
rights and freedoms of the individual in order to benefit the interests of the many. And those 
interests, as well as the legal convictions of ‘the many’, are reflected in the boni mores. 
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